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Domestic Violence as a Basis for Asylum: An 
Analysis of 206 Case Outcomes in the United 
States from 1994 to 2012 
Blaine Bookey* 
I. INTRODUCTION
At age fourteen, Ms. N, a Salvadoran national, met her boyfriend, who 
was five years her senior.  After Ms. N moved in with him, the abuse and 
controlling behavior started including physical violence as well as 
emotional abuse and threats.  Her boyfriend prevented Ms. N from leaving 
the house and having contact with relatives and friends.  After Ms. N gave 
birth to their son, the abuse worsened.  Her boyfriend beat her with his 
fists, his feet, and his belt.  Ms. N’s grandmother attempted to intervene to 
no avail, including seeking help from the Salvadoran judicial system.  Her 
attempts produced only threats on her life from Ms. N’s boyfriend and his 
family.  On one occasion, Ms. N felt so desperate and alone, she tried to 
commit suicide.  She feared reporting the abuse to the police, because she 
knew stories of other women who had tried to report abuse—instead of 
receiving help, they faced retaliation from their abusers.  After enduring 
two years of horrific violence and intimidation, Ms. N left El Salvador in 
2010 to save her life.1 
After Ms. P, a native of Kenya, gave birth to their third son, her 
husband began to control all aspects of her life, forcing her to quit her job 
and inflicting severe and routine physical and sexual abuse.  He beat her in 
public and at home, leaving scars and, on at least one occasion, permanent 
injuries.  When Ms. P’s husband became involved with another woman, the 
beatings intensified, and he infected Ms. P with syphilis and gonorrhea. 
The medication Ms. P took to cure the infections caused a miscarriage of 
their fourth child.  Ms. P’s husband also threatened to kill her.  When Ms. P 
went to her parents’ town, her husband came looking for her.  Although the 
* Staff Attorney, Center for Gender & Refugee Studies (CGRS), and Adjunct
Professor, University of California, Hastings College of the Law.  The author thanks Karen 
Musalo and Lisa Frydman for their contributions and guidance.  Tilman Jacobs and Molly 
Franck, also deserve credit for their tracking and analysis included this article as do Julia 
Epstein and Brianna Krong for their editorial assistance. 
1. CGRS Database Case #7571 (2012).  All CGRS database case numbers referenced
throughout the article are on file with the Center. 
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police became involved on more than one occasion during her marriage, 
they did little to protect Ms. P.  Finally, Ms. P made the heart-wrenching 
decision to leave her children in the care of her brother, and she fled Kenya 
in desperation.2 
These two women came to the United States in search of protection 
that their own governments had failed to provide.  Only one was successful 
in her quest.  The key difference rested on the immigration judges (IJ) 
assigned to hear these claims.  In both cases, the judges agreed that the 
women testified credibly, that the harm they suffered rose to the level of 
persecution, and that their governments had failed to protect them.3  But 
while the judge in Ms. N’s case found that the abuse she suffered was 
inflicted on account of her membership in a particular social group (PSG) 
of “Salvadoran women in domestic relationships who are unable to leave,” 
a group defined by her gender, nationality, and status in a domestic 
relationship, the judge in Ms. P’s case did not believe that there was a 
relationship between the abuse she suffered and any protected ground, 
finding that a group defined by gender, nationality, and status in a domestic 
relationship is not cognizable under the law.4  Ms. N received a grant of 
asylum, but Ms. P’s case is currently pending before the U.S. Board of 
Immigration Appeals (BIA or the Board), which has yet to provide 
guidance to the lower courts for how to handle asylum cases involving 
domestic violence (DV). Similar facts thus yield very different outcomes 
for asylum seekers. 
In 2003, the Center for Gender & Refugee Studies (CGRS or the 
Center) at the University of California, Hastings College of the Law 
published an article examining the state of gender asylum claims in the 
United States.5  In that article, CGRS analyzed forty-five decisions by 
immigration judges and the BIA in gender asylum cases, including twenty-
two cases involving women who fled domestic violence.  The analysis 
2. CGRS Database Case #8491 (2011).
3. This article assumes that the reader has some familiarity with basic asylum principles
related to gender claims.  For a more robust overview of the law and development of gender 
claims in the United States, see Karen Musalo, A Short History of Gender Asylum in the 
United States: Resistance and Ambivalence May Very Slowly Be Inching Towards 
Recognition of Women’s Claims, 29 REFUGEE SURV. Q. 46 (2010) [hereinafter “Musalo, A 
Short History of Gender Asylum”].   
4. To qualify for asylum an applicant must satisfy the immigration statute’s definition of
a “refugee”—a person who is unwilling or unable to return to her home country “because of 
persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, 
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.”  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42). 
5. See Karen Musalo & Stephen Knight, Asylum for Victims of Gender Violence: An
Overview of the Law, and an Analysis of 45 Unpublished Decisions, 2003 IMMIGR. 
BRIEFINGS 1 (2003) [hereinafter “Musalo & Knight, Asylum for Victims of Gender 
Violence”].  Gender asylum is used to describe claims for protection of asylum and 
withholding of removal in which the feared harm is gender-specific or disproportionately 
impacts women and/or the reason the harm is imposed (that is, nexus) is related to or “on 
account of” gender. 
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demonstrated that a number of adjudicators viewed developments in the 
United States—namely the issuance of proposed regulations on gender-
based asylum6 and the vacatur of the BIA’s precedential decision denying 
asylum to a domestic violence survivor in Matter of R-A-7—as removing 
obstacles to granting relief in gender asylum cases. However, other 
adjudicators continued to perceive R-A-, despite vacatur, as posing 
obstacles to granting asylum protection to women fleeing a broad range of 
gender-based harms.  Given these inconsistent outcomes, adjudicators 
clearly needed additional guidance from the government and the courts, in 
particular with respect to the treatment of domestic violence asylum claims. 
Despite positive developments over the last decade, the disparity in the 
treatment of Ms. N and Ms. P shows the continued and urgent need for 
guidance. 
The proposed gender regulations have not been issued in their final 
form,8 and no BIA or U.S. Federal Court of Appeals decision has squarely 
held that domestic violence is (or is not) a basis for asylum in the United 
States.  Nevertheless, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has 
taken the position in the landmark Matter of R-A- case, as well as a similar, 
highly publicized asylum case known as Matter of L-R- that women who 
have suffered domestic violence may establish eligibility for asylum and 
withholding of removal based on, inter alia, membership in a PSG.  The 
granting of asylum to the women in R-A- and L-R- by stipulation of the 
parties in 2009 and 2010, respectively, has opened doors for other women. 
Still, the absence of applicable jurisprudential or regulatory norms and 
shifting policy positions by DHS on a case-by-case basis has led to 
contradictory and arbitrary outcomes.9 
Disparities in asylum adjudication in the United States have been well 
documented.10  However, exposing failures in the administrative system 
has had minimal impact on creating accountability, in part due to the 
continued lack of transparency in decision making.  IJ decisions as well as 
Asylum Office (AO) and many BIA decisions are not published or 
6. See Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. 76588 (proposed Dec. 7,
2000) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 208) [hereinafter “Proposed Regulations”]. 
7. Matter of R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906 (BIA 1999).
8. The Obama Administration indicated its intention to issue the proposed regulations in
2010, but this never happened.  The Regulatory Plan, 74 Fed. Reg. 64137, 64220-21 (Dec. 
7, 2009) [hereinafter “The Regulatory Plan”]. 
9. The government itself has noted that the piecemeal approach taken so far in gender
cases “has resulted in inconsistent and confusing standards.”  Id. at 64221. 
10. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-940, U.S. ASYLUM SYSTEM:
SIGNIFICANT VARIATION EXISTED IN ASYLUM OUTCOMES ACROSS IMMIGRATION COURTS AND
JUDGES 7 (2008) (analyzing more than 198,000 asylum decisions rendered by immigration 
judges in from Oct. 1, 1994 through Apr. 30, 2007) [hereinafter “GAO, U.S. ASYLUM 
SYSTEM”]; Ramji-Nogales et al., Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, 60 
STAN. L. REV. 295, 296 (2007) (analyzing more than 400,000 decisions from all levels of the 
asylum adjudication process in the United States). 
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available in any publicly searchable database.11 This lack of transparency 
and accountability extends to the actions of DHS attorneys across the 
country who present arguments to IJs and the Board in domestic violence 
asylum cases that are at times inconsistent with the agency’s position in R-
A- and L-R-.  This deficit of information is particularly pronounced in the 
domestic violence context, because IJ and BIA decisions have received 
scant review by the Courts of Appeals—the result of a decade-long halt on 
the adjudication of domestic violence claims at the lower levels—whose 
decisions are publicly available. 
This article analyzes 206 outcomes12 in domestic violence asylum cases 
before the immigration courts and the Board dating from December 1994 to 
May 2012 in order to shed light on decision-making trends and provide 
greater transparency to the asylum system. Part II provides the 
methodology and Part III provides the findings and analysis.  The analysis 
focuses on how PSGs based on domestic violence are formulated and 
treated, grouping adjudications collected by CGRS into time periods 
marked by significant events in the Matter of R-A- and L-R- cases.  This 
analysis clearly demonstrates that whereas some immigration judges have 
begun to accept asylum claims involving domestic violence in light of 
developments in R-A-, L-R-, and related cases, the absence of binding 
norms remains a major impediment to fair and consistent outcomes for 
women who fear return to countries where they confront unimaginable 
harms, or worse, death.  Without clear guidance, the United States will 
continue to shirk its international obligations to protect women who present 
bona fide claims for relief.  
II. METHODOLOGY
A. COLLECTION OF CASE OUTCOMES BY CGRS
CGRS maintains an extensive database with information on more than
6,000 gender-based, child, and lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender 
(LGBT) asylum claims.  Attorneys provide the information to the Center 
with the consent of their clients.  Some or all of the following information 
is contained in individual case records in the Center’s database: country of 
origin; key facts; type of persecution; applicable bars to asylum or 
withholding; legal theory; evidence or experts used in the case; procedural 
history and posture of the case, including the jurisdiction and assigned IJ; 
and rationale for the decision to grant or deny relief.  In addition to the 
11. See Sydenham B. Alexander, A Political Response to Crisis in the Immigration
Courts, 21 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1 (2006). 
12. This article includes analysis of 206 outcomes, but only 198 distinct cases.  This is
the result of some cases having had multiple decisions rendered during the time periods 
studied.  The Matter of R-A- and Matter of L-R- cases are not included in the total.  
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information included in the individual case records, CGRS also keeps on 
file unpublished IJ or BIA decisions in hundreds of cases.  The database 
contains written opinions for 118 of the 206 case outcomes analyzed for 
this article.  The information for eighty-eight case outcomes derives from 
notes, briefs, and other documents submitted to the immigration courts that 
the attorneys shared with CGRS.   
The Center collects this information through its Technical Assistance 
Program, which provides attorneys who request assistance from CGRS 
with legal consultation, expert affidavits, and country conditions 
documentation.  After providing assistance, CGRS maintains contact with 
attorneys to learn about developments and outcomes in their cases.  The 
Center also collects information from attorneys who do not seek assistance 
but otherwise learn that CGRS tracks this type of information, as well as 
through the Center’s involvement in some cases as counsel of record or 
amicus counsel.13  The information collected in the database is unique and 
unavailable from any other source.  Numerous researchers have used the 
CGRS database to analyze trends in asylum adjudication across the country 
in a variety of areas.14 
B. SCOPE OF SAMPLE CASE OUTCOMES IN THE CGRS DATABASE
For present purposes, the definition of domestic violence-based asylum
claims has been limited to those predicated on relief sought from “intimate 
partner” violence.  Therefore, the analysis excluded cases in the database 
coded as “domestic violence” that involve claims of child abuse, threats of 
forced marriage, or sale into human trafficking by family members other 
than an intimate partner.  Similarly excluded were cases that involve other 
types of persecution on account of gender, such as female genital cutting 
(FGC), where no other intimate partner violence was present.  All of the 
cases analyzed involve male aggressors and female victims.15 
13. Attorneys can submit requests for assistance or amicus support by visiting the CGRS
website, available at http://cgrs.uchastings.edu/assistance/. 
14. See, e.g., Kim Thuy Seelinger, Forced Marriage and Asylum: Perceiving the
Invisible Harm, 42 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 55 (2010) (analyzing unpublished decisions 
in asylum cases involving forced marriage); Lisa Frydman & Kim Seelinger, Kasinga’s 
Protection Undermined? Recent Developments in Female Genital Cutting Jurisprudence, 18 
BENDER’S IMMIGR. BULL.1073 (2008) (analyzing treatment of asylum claims involving 
female genital cutting); Karen Musalo & Marcelle Rice, The Implementation of the One-
Year Bar to Asylum, 31 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 693 (2008) (analyzing decisions 
regarding application of the one-year bar to asylum); Musalo & Knight, Asylum for Victims 
of Gender Violence, supra note 5 (analyzing the treatment of gender asylum claims 
generally).  See also Sarah Rogerson, Waiting for Alvarado: How Administrative Delay 
Harms Victims of Gender-Based Violence Seeking Asylum, 55 WAYNE L. REV. 1811 (2009) 
(analyzing impact of proposed gender regulations on decision making from 2001-2009 in 
gender asylum cases based in large part on outcomes published by CGRS). 
15. This is not to say there are no male victims of domestic violence or that domestic
violence does not occur in same-sex relationships, but rather merely reflects the case 
information collected by CGRS and analyzed in this article. 
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Moreover, information in the database regarding case outcomes at the 
Asylum Office has not been included, because the AO does not provide 
extensive legal analysis, which impedes the Center’s ability to track how 
developments in the law have affected asylum officer adjudications.16 
C. ORGANIZATION OF CGRS DATABASE CASE OUTCOMES FOR ANALYSIS
The cases chosen for analysis were grouped chronologically by the date
of the IJ or BIA decision, in order to analyze how adjudicators responded 
to external events.  Seven distinct time periods were identified using 
important markers in the evolution of domestic violence asylum claims in 
the U.S.  The chosen markers track developments in the Matter of R-A- and 
Matter of L-R- cases.  Understanding the analysis of case outcomes requires 
basic knowledge of the developments in domestic violence asylum, and of 
these two cases specifically.  A brief overview is provided here.   
1. Prior to June 11, 1999: pre-Matter of R-A- 
Prior to the BIA’s decision in Matter of R-A-, issued on June 11, 1999,
no precedent decisions by the BIA or the Courts of Appeals, nor binding 
regulatory guidance existed regarding domestic violence as a basis for 
asylum.  In 1995, the United States issued gender guidelines that provided 
examples of gendered harms that could constitute persecution, including 
domestic violence, but the guidelines did not bind IJs, the BIA, or the 
Courts of Appeals.17  In addition, although the Board broke new ground in 
gender-related claims in a decision the following year, Matter of Kasinga,18 
granting asylum to a Togolese woman who fled her country to escape 
female genital cutting, the decision was not directly on point in domestic 
violence cases.19  The Kasinga decision was (and remains), important to the 
domestic violence context because it applied the BIA’s seminal social 
group decision, Matter of Acosta,20 holding that a social group is defined by 
characteristics that are immutable or fundamental, to hold that an applicant 
16. As of July 5, 2012, CGRS had on file 287 grants and 129 denials in DV asylum cases
from Asylum Offices across the country over the last seventeen years. 
17. Memorandum from Phyllis Coven, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Considerations for Asylum
Officers Adjudicating Asylum Claims From Women (May 26, 1995), published in 72, No. 
22 INTERPRETER RELEASES 771, 771 (June 1995). 
18. Matter of Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357 (BIA 1996).
19. The BIA’s Kasinga decision overcame interpretive barriers that often stand in the
way of relief in gender-based asylum claims.  For example, it found FGC to be persecution, 
notwithstanding the fact that it is a widely condoned cultural practice.  It recognized that 
social groups could be defined in reference to gender and it did so in a case involving non-
state actors—namely the family and community that sought to impose genital cutting.  In 
addition, the BIA had no difficulty finding a nexus between the persecution and social group 
membership by taking the societal context into consideration. 
20. Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211 (BIA 1985).
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can establish membership in a PSG defined by gender in combination with 
other characteristics.21 
2. June 12, 1999 –January 19, 2001: BIA issued a precedential
opinion on domestic violence asylum in Matter of R-A-
In the BIA’s precedent-setting domestic violence asylum decision, 
Matter of R-A-, delivered June 11, 1999, the Board held that the horrific 
abuse suffered by the applicant, Ms. Rody Alvarado, constituted 
persecution, but concluded that it was not inflicted by her husband on 
account of her membership in a PSG or any other protected ground. The 
BIA rejected the social group formulation accepted by the IJ, “Guatemalan 
women who have been involved intimately with Guatemalan male 
companions who believe that women are to live under male domination,” 
because even if joined by immutable or fundamental characteristics in line 
with Acosta, it said, the group was not “recognized and understood to be a 
societal faction.”22  The BIA also rejected the relevance of societal context 
in determining nexus between the harm and Ms. Alvarado’s group 
membership.23  The Board’s PSG and nexus analyses in R-A- thus stood in 
contrast to its prior Acosta and Kasinga decisions, confusing the 
jurisprudence.24  In addition, the Board found that Ms. Alvarado did not 
establish that her husband’s behavior was motivated by her actual or 
imputed political opinion.  During this period, the BIA issued another 
notable precedential domestic violence decision in Matter of S-A-.25  
However, S-A- involved parental, not spousal, abuse and was based on 
religion, not PSG. 
21. The particular social group was defined in Kasinga as “[y]oung women of the
Tchamba-Kunsuntu Tribe who have not had [female genital mutilation], as practiced by the 
tribe, and who oppose the practice.”  
22. This language regarding the recognition of a group as a societal faction was the
forerunner to the BIA’s ruling that not all groups that share an immutable or fundamental 
characteristic are cognizable.  In addition to the Acosta factors, the BIA has since required 
that “social visibility” and “particularity” of the groups be established. 
23. The Board’s approach was out of step with the recommendations of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) that societal context is relevant in 
determining the motivation for persecution.  Musalo, A Short History of Gender Asylum, 
supra note 3, at 56. 
24. In December 2000, while the R-A- decision was in effect, the Department of Justice
issued proposed regulations to promote uniform interpretation of gender asylum claims that 
include a substantial amount of guidance favorable to claims based on domestic violence.  
The preamble states that the regulation serves to remove “certain barriers that the In re R-A- 
decision seems to pose” to domestic violence claims, that gender is an immutable 
characteristic, and that marital status may be considered immutable in appropriate 
circumstances.  Proposed Regulations, supra note 6.  The proposed regulations also firmly 
establish Acosta as the standard for PSGs.  However, the regulations were not finalized 
during this period, so were not binding on IJs or the BIA.   
25. Matter of S-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1328 (BIA 2000) (holding that father persecuted
daughter on account of her liberal Muslim beliefs concerning the proper role of women in 
Moroccan society). 
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3. January 20, 2001 – February 19, 2004: Matter of R-A- vacated by
the U.S. Attorney General with no further guidance provided
The Board’s 1999 decision in Matter of R-A- provoked a firestorm of 
criticism.  Sustained pressure from various constituencies across the 
country, including several members of the U.S. Congress, led then U.S. 
Attorney General (AG) Janet Reno to become directly involved in the case 
in a process that allows the AG to “certify” a case to herself for a 
decision.26  After she accorded herself jurisdiction over the case, on 
January 19, 2001, AG Reno vacated the BIA’s R-A- decision and remanded 
it to the Board to decide at such time as the proposed gender regulations 
became final.  Therefore, after January 19, 2001, R-A- no longer bound 
immigration judges or the Board.  However, AG Reno’s remand order 
hamstrung the BIA from issuing a new decision in R-A- until the proposed 
gender regulations became final (which has yet to occur).  Adjudicators at 
the lower levels were again left without clear guidance regarding the 
treatment of domestic violence asylum cases.27 
4. February 20, 2004 – September 25, 2008: DHS announced its
position in DV asylum cases in Matter of R-A-, at that time pending
at the Board
On February 19, 2004, DHS submitted a brief to AG John Ashcroft, 
who had recertified the Matter of R-A- case to his authority.  Notable was 
the fact that DHS reversed course from its previous position and argued 
that Ms. Alvarado had established eligibility for asylum on account of her 
membership in a PSG.28  DHS defined the social group as “married women 
in Guatemala who are unable to leave the relationship.”29  Of particular 
importance, DHS affirmed the BIA’s seminal Acosta decision as the 
touchstone for defining social groups.  Using Acosta as the framework, 
DHS argued that gender is immutable and that marital status may be 
immutable or fundamental where factors make it so, for example, “if a 
woman could not reasonably be expected to divorce because of religious, 
cultural or legal constraints, or because evidence indicates that her husband 
would not recognize a divorce or separation as ending the relationship.”30  
DHS further argued that a group need not “be small in order to qualify as a 
26. In the United States, the Attorney General has the authority to certify cases to him- or
herself for decision.  See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h)(1)(i).  Any decision issued by the AG is 
binding on the BIA and immigration courts in every jurisdiction where there is no 
contravening federal court of appeals decision.   
27. See Proposed Regulations, supra note 6.
28. DHS’s Position on Respondent’s Eligibility for Relief, Matter of R-A-, 23 I. & N.
Dec. 694 (A.G. 2005) (A 73 753 922), available at http://cgrs.uchastings.edu/documents/ 
legal/dhs_brief_ra.pdf [hereinafter “DHS R-A- Br.”].   
29. Id. at 15.
30. Id. at 20.
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particular social group.”31  The brief also addressed nexus in domestic 
violence cases in a manner that incorporated circumstantial evidence of the 
societal context in which the violence occurs.  In addition, DHS disavowed 
as “fundamentally flawed” the Board’s finding in R-A- that lack of 
evidence that Ms. Alvarado’s husband sought to harm other group 
members indicated that he was not motivated by group membership.32  
Rather than rule on the case, AG Ashcroft sent it back to the BIA and 
imposed a stay.  The BIA was again ordered to refrain from reconsidering 
the case until the proposed regulations were in final form.  This fourth time 
period includes cases decided after DHS set forth its framework for 
domestic violence cases in the R-A- brief until the Executive took further 
action in R-A- in 2008.33 
5. September 26, 2008 – July 16, 2009: AG lifted the stay in Matter
of R-A- 
On September 25, 2008, AG Michael Mukasey lifted the stay imposed 
on the BIA and remanded Matter of R-A- for immediate reconsideration of 
the issues presented with respect to asylum claims based on domestic 
violence notwithstanding that regulations had yet to be finalized.  This next 
time period includes cases decided after AG Mukasey’s order until DHS 
clarified its position in domestic violence cases the following year. 
Although no new precedent was issued, this period was significant because 
many women were left in legal limbo while the prior AG stay orders had 
been in effect.34  After the stay was lifted, the Board remanded some 
domestic violence cases, including R-A-, to the immigration court and 
requested supplemental briefing in other cases in light of the BIA’s 
imposition of “social visibility” and “particularity” into the PSG analysis.35  
31. DHS R-A- Br. at 22.
32. Id. at 32.  Circumstantial evidence of the persecutor’s motive to harm his partner on
account of her status in the relationship could include “evidence that such patterns of 
violence are (1) supported by the legal system or social norms in the country in question, 
and (2) reflect a prevalent belief within society, or within relevant segments of society, that 
cannot be deduced simply by evidence of random acts within that society.”  Id. at 36. 
33. Id. at 36; DHS’s Supplemental Brief, Matter of L-R- (BIA Apr. 13, 2009),
available at http://cgrs.uchastings.edu/pdfs/Redacted%20DHS%20brief%20on%20PSG.pdf 
[hereinafter “DHS L-R- Br.”]. 
34. While the stay was in effect, asylum offices sent DV asylum cases to headquarters in
Washington. D.C., immigration judges administratively closed the cases or continued them 
indefinitely, and the BIA sat on appeals for years, waiting for direction.  See Lisa Frydman, 
Recent Developments in Domestic-Violence-Based Asylum Claims, 2009 LEXISNEXIS
EMERGING ISSUES ANALYSIS 4075 (2009) [hereinafter “Frydman, Recent Developments”].  
35. The new requirements were imposed by the BIA in 2006 during the protracted battle
in R-A-.  See Matter of C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951 (BIA 2006), aff’d Castillo-Arias v. Att’y 
Gen., 446 F.3d 1190 (11th Cir. 2006).  Social visibility requires that the members of the 
group be visible to the society at large, while particularity requires that the group be clearly 
defined with concise boundaries.  Not all courts of appeals have accepted these 
requirements.  See Gatimi v. Holder, 578 F.3d 611, 615 (7th Cir. 2009) (rejecting BIA’s 
requirement of social visibility and remanding for consideration of social group claim); 
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The Board did not issue a precedential decision in R-A- or in any of the 
other cases to guide the lower courts. 
6. July 17, 2009 – December 10, 2009: DHS updated its position in
DV cases in Matter of L-R-
While R-A- was pending on remand before the immigration judge, 
DHS filed a supplemental brief to the BIA in the related Matter of L-R- 
case. The brief became public on July 16, 2009.36  The agency’s approach 
in its supplemental brief in L-R-, a case involving a Mexican woman who 
fled more than two decades of atrocious abuse at the hands of her common- 
law husband, builds on the position it articulated in its R-A- brief.  
Together, the briefs set forth DHS’s official position regarding domestic 
violence claims.  The significant difference between the 2004 and 2009 
briefs is that the latter includes the agency’s position on how the BIA’s new 
social group requirements of “social visibility” and “particularity” can be 
met in such cases.  Specific to the asylum seeker in L-R-, DHS advanced 
two formulations of a social group that it argued could meet the 
immutability, visibility, and particularity requirements, depending on the 
facts in the record: (1) Mexican women in domestic relationships who are 
unable to leave; or (2) Mexican women who are viewed as property by 
virtue of their position in a domestic relationship.37  The brief also noted 
that, in appropriate cases, the social group can be based on family.  DHS 
explained that social visibility refers to the fact that society (including 
government) perceives the defined group in a certain way and accords 
group members different treatment on that basis, which can be shown by 
prevailing laws, application of laws including impunity for violations, and 
broad societal attitudes.38  With respect to particularity, DHS explained that 
the group must be defined with sufficient specificity to delimit 
membership, and that characteristics of the group, such as a “domestic 
relationship,” are susceptible to clear definition.39  The BIA heeded DHS’s 
request to remand L-R- to the immigration judge for additional fact-finding 
but, as in R-A-, it did so without issuing a precedential opinion clarifying 
the doctrine.  In addition to L-R-, the Board started remanding other DV 
asylum cases to the immigration courts for record development as a matter 
of course. 
Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Att’y Gen., 663 F.3d 582, 608 (3d Cir. 2011) (declining to defer to 
the BIA’s requirements of social visibility and particularity and affording the BIA the 
opportunity to provide a reasoned explanation as to their meaning on remand); Henriquez-
Rivas v. Holder, 449 F. App’x 626 (9th Cir. 2011), rehearing en banc ordered by 670 F.3d 
1033 (9th Cir. 2012) (at the time of writing, reconsidering the issue en banc). 
36. DHS L-R- Br., supra note 33, at 23.
37. Id. at 14.
38. Id. at 17–18.
39. Id. at 19.
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7. December 11, 2009 – present: asylum was granted by the IJ in
Matter of R-A- 
On December 10, 2009, an immigration judge in San Francisco finally 
granted asylum to Ms. Alvarado. Although the IJ’s order was less than a 
sentence long and had no precedential value,40 the victory had great 
symbolic significance.  The case had become the battleground on which the 
issue of domestic violence as a basis of asylum had been fought for more 
than a decade, and the case in which DHS first set forth a framework for 
asylum eligibility in domestic violence cases.  The final group of cases 
analyzed includes IJ and BIA decisions issued since the R-A- grant; the 
most recent decision was rendered on May17, 2012.  While several women 
fleeing domestic violence have experienced victories in the wake of R-A-, 
including the applicant in L-R-,41 the Board still has not issued a 
precedential decision on the viability of domestic violence asylum, and the 
Executive has yet to finalize regulations. 
D. LIMITATIONS OF ANALYSIS OF CGRS DATABASE CASES
No official statistics exist regarding the number of asylum cases
adjudicated in the United States that involve domestic violence as a basis 
for protection.42  Therefore, it is impossible to know if the information in 
the CGRS database provides a representative sample.  Consequently, the 
analysis does not provide any statistical analysis or draw any conclusions 
regarding probable outcomes.  Moreover, the sample outcomes originate 
primarily from attorneys who contacted CGRS for assistance, and thus do 
not represent random case outcomes.  The dataset, however, represents a 
diversity of jurisdictions across the country, with cases concentrated in 
states with high levels of migration: California, Florida, New York, and 
Texas.43  IJs located in those four states heard 111 of the 206 cases, or 
40. The IJ’s decision stated: “Inasmuch as there is no binding authority on the legal
issues raised in this case, I conclude that I can conscientiously accept what is essentially the 
agreement of the parties [to grant asylum].”  CGRS Database Case #59 (2009). 
41. Like the decision in R-A-, the IJ decision in L-R- may be symbolic, but it too holds no
precedential value.  The IJ’s summary order simply states that asylum is granted and 
includes a notation that it was a result of “stipulation of the parties.”  CGRS Database Case 
#5363 (2010). 
42. In Fiscal Year 2008, more than 47,000 claims for asylum were adjudicated in
removal proceedings (a figure that does not include claims by individuals not in removal 
proceedings, which are processed by the Secretary of Homeland Security).  See OFFICE OF
PLANNING, ANALYSIS, AND TECHNOLOGY, EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW,
IMMIGRATION COURTS FY 2008 ASYLUM STATISTICS (2009).  The statistics are divided by 
country only, however, and there are no statistics available regarding the number of gender 
claims advanced in proceedings, let alone statistics regarding the number of claims that 
involve domestic violence.  
43. The Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) of the U.S. Department of
Justice operates immigration courts in fifty-nine cities in twenty-nine states.  See Dep’t of 
Justice, EOIR Immigration Court Listing, http://www.justice.gov/eoir/sibpages/ICadr.htm 
(last visited Oct. 15, 2012). 
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about fifty-four percent.  San Francisco (forty-five cases), New York City 
(eighteen), and San Antonio (fourteen) produced the largest representation 
in the data sample (see Table 1 below).44  Other jurisdictions produced 
between one and twelve outcomes over the studied time period.45 
TABLE 1: GRANT RATES BY IMMIGRATION COURTS FOR COURTS WITH 







San Francisco, California 35 10 45 
New York, New York 13 5 18 
San Antonio, Texas 10 4 14 
Miami, Florida 6 5 11 
Seattle, Washington 7 3 10 
Arlington, Virginia 7 1 8 
Los Angeles, California 3 5 8 
Baltimore, Maryland 8 1 9 
San Diego, California 4 3 7 
Boston, Massachusetts 6 1 7 
Chicago, Illinois 2 3 5 
The CGRS database drew domestic violence asylum outcomes from 
117 different immigration judges across the country.  The sample includes 
multiple decisions from thirty-three different IJs, both male and female (see 
Table 2 below), which allowed for an analysis of the individual 
adjudicator’s response to the external events over time.  Where the sample 
produced only one decision from a particular IJ, by contrast, it was not 
possible to track that particular judge’s decision making over time.  
44. These courts are among the courts that receive the highest volume of asylum cases
generally.  See GAO, U.S. ASYLUM SYSTEM, supra note 10. 
45. The cities where the cases recorded in the CGRS database were heard include the
following in alphabetical order: Anchorage, Alaska (1 case outcome); Arlington, Virginia 
(8); Atlanta, Georgia (1); Baltimore, Maryland (7); Bloomington, Minnesota (3); Boston, 
Massachusetts (7); Bradenton, Florida (1); Charlotte, North Carolina (1); Chicago, Illinois 
(5); Dallas, Texas (1); Denver, Colorado (4); El Paso, Texas (3); Elizabeth, New Jersey (4); 
Eloy, Arizona (1); Harlingen, Texas (1); Hartford, Connecticut (3); Houston, Texas (3); 
Kansas City, Missouri (1); Los Angeles, California (8); Memphis, Tennessee (2); Miami, 
Florida (12); Newark, New Jersey (2); Oakdale, Louisiana (1); Omaha, Nebraska (2); 
Orlando, Florida (1); Portland, Oregon (4); Puerto Rico (1); San Antonio, Texas (14); San 
Diego, California (6); Seattle, Washington (10); Tacoma, Washington (2); Tucson, Arizona 
(1); York, Pennsylvania (5).  The precise jurisdiction is unknown for four cases for which 
CGRS does not have written decisions on file. 
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TABLE 2: GRANT RATES BY GENDER OF ADJUDICATOR FOR 







Male 66 (63.5%) 38 (36.5%) 104 
Female 55 (73%) 20 (27%) 75 
Unknown 16 2 18 
Some case reports in the CGRS database remain incomplete; in some 
instances, for example, the database indicates that an appeal was filed with 
the BIA or the Courts of Appeals, but CGRS has not been able to track the 
case’s ultimate resolution.46  In other instances, it is possible that an appeal 
was filed, but CGRS was not made privy to this information.  In any event, 
lack of complete information concerning appeals and final outcomes does 
not affect the analysis of the correlation between external events and 
decision making.   
Finally, the CGRS dataset of domestic violence asylum cases is skewed 
towards positive outcomes precisely because CGRS learns of these cases 
from attorneys—thus, these cases concern asylum seekers who had legal 
representation, and whose legal counsel sought expert assistance.  The 
dataset includes 126 grants of asylum, ten grants of withholding of 
removal, and four grants of relief under the Convention Against Torture 
(CAT), or sixty-eight percent positive outcomes.  By comparison, there are 
only sixty-three recorded denials of any form of relief, representing thirty-
one percent of the sample.  This approximate ratio of 2.2 grants for every 
denial probably does not accurately reflect the success of domestic 
violence-based asylum claims nationwide.  It more likely shows a stronger 
desire or willingness from attorneys to report positive rather than negative 
outcomes.  And attorneys who request technical assistance from CGRS 
may have a higher rate of success than those who do not; certainly this 
success rate is higher than the rate for asylum seekers who do not have 
legal representation.   
III. FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS
A. OVERVIEW OF CGRS DATABASE CASE OUTCOMES ANALYZED
This article analyzes 206 outcomes in domestic violence asylum cases
decided in the United States between December 1994 and May 2012.  The 
46. CGRS attempts to track outcomes periodically by following up with attorneys, but
attorneys change firms or leave the profession, and it can be difficult to track down a final 
outcome for some cases. 
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sample includes 140 grants of relief and sixty-three denials (see Figure 1 
below).  The sample also includes three grants of motions to reopen (MTR) 
to apply for asylum on the basis of DV.  Immigration judges issued the 
majority of the decisions; only eight of the decisions came from the BIA.47 
The following legal rationales form the basis of the grants of asylum or 
withholding of removal:  
 Particular social group based on domestic violence (DV-PSG)
 DV-PSG + political opinion (PO) or imputed political opinion
(IPO) based on resistance to domestic violence (DV-PO)
 DV-PO only
 PSG based on other factors (such as FGC)
 Religion only
47. As explained earlier, the BIA held domestic violence asylum cases from the time that
Matter of R-A- was vacated in 2001 until AG Mukasey lifted the stay in 2008.  After the 
stay was lifted, the Board remanded many cases that had been on appeal, so these cases are 
only now returning to the Board for adjudication.  CGRS knows of several domestic 
violence asylum cases pending at the Board. 
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The majority, 118 out of 136, of the grants of asylum and withholding 
were based on the domestic violence related rationales (DV-PSG, DV-PSG 
+ DV-PO, or DV-PO) (see Figure 2 below).
The most common reasons given for denial were the lack of a 
cognizable social group or the failure to demonstrate nexus to a protected 
ground (see Table 3 below).48 In any given decision, a judge may have 
presented several alternative bases for denial, so the following numbers 
reflect the frequency of the alternative bases in the sixty-three rejected 
cases.  They do not reflect separate decisions, and therefore they total a 
number greater than sixty-three.  In addition to lack of PSG or nexus (fifty 
decisions), denials were also most frequently based on:  
 Failure to show the government’s inability or unwillingness to
protect (nineteen)
 Lack of credibility or sufficient evidence (eleven)
 Lack of political opinion (fifteen)
 Internal relocation alternative (six)
 No well-founded fear of future persecution (five)
 Failure to establish membership in a PSG, assuming arguendo
a PSG exists (four)
 Lack of religion (one)
Notably, many of the judges who denied relief had no trouble finding 
that the harm the applicants suffered—often involving severe physical, 
48. IJs often conflated the PSG (cognizability) and the nexus (motive of persecutor)
inquiries; for example, the decision to reject a proffered DV-PSG was often expressed as the 
failure to establish nexus to a protected ground. 
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sexual, and psychological violence—constituted persecution, or even that 
the fear of future harm was well-founded.49 
The women in these cases hail from countries around the world.  But 
most of the domestic violence cases in the CGRS database involve women 
fleeing from countries in Latin America (136 cases), in particular, 
Guatemala (thirty-two cases), Honduras (twenty-nine), Mexico (twenty-
three), and El Salvador (twenty-three).50  No distinct patterns emerge with 
respect to the applicant’s country of origin and the case outcome. 
B. CHRONOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF THE TREATMENT OF DV ASYLUM
CLAIMS IN UNPUBLISHED AGENCY DECISIONS: THE INFLUENCE OF
EXTERNAL EVENTS
The formulation and treatment of domestic violence asylum claims that 
advance a PSG as the principal basis for relief provides the focus for this 
analysis.  PSG is the stated rationale in most of the grants and lack of PSG 
the stated fatal flaw in most of the denials captured by the CGRS database. 
An analysis with this focus, therefore, can highlight the types of PSGs 
accepted and rejected by adjudicators as well as identify other trends in 
legal reasoning in relation to developments in domestic violence asylum 
law and asylum law more generally in the United States, using particular 
time periods (see Table 3 below).   
49. See, e.g., CGRS Database Cases #8002 (2007); #8491 (2011).
50. Other countries of origin include the following:
 Africa (twenty-nine total):  Cameroon (5); Congo (1); Gambia (3); Ghana (2); Guinea
(5); Ivory Coast (1); Kenya (3); Liberia (1); Mali (1); Nigeria (2); Sierra Leone 
(1); Uganda (3); and Zimbabwe (1).   
 Asia (eighteen total): Bangladesh (4); Cambodia (1); India (3); Indonesia (2);
Malaysia (1); and Mongolia (7).  
 Europe (sixteen total):  Albania (1); Armenia (2); Croatia (1); France (1); Lithuania
(1); Moldova (1); Poland (1); Slovenia (1); Spain (1); Turkey (1); and Ukraine (5).  
 Middle East (six total): Egypt (1); Jordan (4); and Lebanon (1).
 Latin America and the Caribbean (136 total):  Barbados (1); Bolivia (1); Brazil (2);
Costa Rica (1); Dominican Republic (6); Ecuador (2); El Salvador (23); 
Guatemala (32); Haiti (1); Honduras (29); Mexico (23); Nicaragua (10); Panama 
(1); and Peru (4). 
This distribution of cases does not purport to paint an accurate picture of the prevalence of 
domestic violence globally, but rather reflects the number of cases that appear in the CGRS 
database.   
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TABLE 3: CASE OUTCOMES FROM THE CGRS DATABASE 



































8  5 27 34 1 4 38 117 
Granted: 
Other 




0 5 18 11 2 4 13 53 
Denied: 
Other 




10 12 52 59 3 12 55 20351
1. Prior to June 11, 1999: CGRS database case outcomes decided
before the BIA’s decision in Matter of R-A-
The CGRS database recorded ten grants (nine asylum and one 
withholding) in domestic violence cases during the time period prior to the 
Board’s decision in Matter of R-A-.52  CGRS recorded no denials during 
this period.  All of the claims in the CGRS database prior to June 11, 1999, 
reflect persecution on account of DV-PSG or DV-PSG + DV-PO.  The fact 
that the social group in Kasinga included the applicant’s opinion about 
female genital cutting and resistance to gender norms seemed to influence 
judges during this period, as several of the PSGs deemed cognizable for 
domestic violence applicants after Kasinga mirrored this formulation. 
Gender, nationality, other characteristics related to the applicant’s status in 
a domestic relationship, and feminist opinion generally defined the social 
groups.53  The IJs recognized political opinions that also related to the 
51. The three decisions granting motions to reopen did not involve an analysis of the
merits of the underlying claim for relief and these decisions are therefore not included in 
this table. 
52. The CGRS database produced written decisions for eight of the cases.
53. Accepted PSGs during this period include:
 Guatemalan women who are or have been affiliated with men who believe it is their
right to dominate “their women” by force or violence.  CGRS Database Case #35 
(1996). 
 Jordanian women who espouse western values and who are unwilling to live their
lives at the mercy of their husbands, their society, and their government and/or 
women who are challenging the traditions of Jordanian society and government. 
CGRS Database Case #42 (1994). 
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PSGs, such as a woman’s opposition and resistance to gender norms.  In 
one case, the IJ concluded that the PSG and the PO were “interchangeable” 
because the applicant challenged traditions in the society and it was 
precisely because of her views that she was “beaten to achieve her 
submission into the society’s mores” and that she “should not be required 
to dispose of her beliefs.”54 
The written opinions in the CGRS database from this time provide 
detailed legal reasoning.  In support of their holdings, the IJs cite most 
frequently to the 1995 guidelines, the BIA’s decision in Kasinga, and 
decisions from the Courts of Appeals recognizing family-based and gender-
based persecution,55 including Fatin v. INS, recognizing that gender is a 
characteristic that can link the members of a PSG, and that women or 
women who refuse to conform to the government’s gender-specific laws 
and social norms are cognizable groups,56 and Lazo-Majano v. INS, holding 
that flight from abuser constituted an assertion of political opinion.57 
Noteworthy from this period is the degree to which judges looked to 
opinions from their colleagues as persuasive precedent in light of a lack of 
other binding precedent or guidance.  Judges looked to the opinions of 
fellow IJs both within the same court as well as across jurisdictions.  For 
example, the first recorded domestic violence case available in the CGRS 
database comes from a judge in Arlington, Virginia, granting asylum to a 
woman from Jordan in December 1994.58  Predating the issuance of gender 
guidelines and the BIA’s opinion in Kasinga, the opinion includes robust 
analysis of the cognizability of a gender-related social group under Acosta 
and Fatin.  The same judge also issued a positive opinion the following 
year tracking the same legal analysis in a case involving a woman from 
Sierra Leone.59  In 1998, a Boston-based IJ cited to his Arlington 
colleague’s analysis in the Jordanian and Sierra Leonean cases as 
 Fartalen (without anyone to protect her rights, or orphan) Malinke women who refuse
to conform to gender-specific societal norms.  CGRS Database Case #58 (1998). 
 Young, Westernized, Muslim wives in Bangladesh with a feminist political opinion
and women of Bangladesh who have been victims of spousal abuse, especially by 
spouses who were in significant positions with the government of that particular 
country.  CGRS Database Case #373 (1996). 
 Guatemalan women who are intimately involved with a male companion who
believes that women are to live under male domination.  CGRS Database Case 
#59; Matter of R-A- (1996).  
 Ghanaian women who have been intimate with men who believe it is their right to
practice force or violence on their female companions.  CGRS Database Case #47 
(1997). 
54. CGRS Database Case #42 (1994).
55. CGRS Database Cases #42 (1994); #41 (1995); #845 (1995); #59 (1996); #373
(1996); #35 (1996); #47 (1997); #58 (1998). 
56. Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1240-41 (3d Cir. 1993).
57. Lato-Majano v. INS, 813 F.2d 1432, 1435 (9th Cir. 1987).
58. CGRS Database Case #42 (1994).
59. CGRS Database Case #41(1995).
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persuasive authority and granted relief to a Guinean woman on similar 
grounds.60  The CGRS database also includes opinions from this period 
authored by three different San Francisco immigration court judges setting 
forth virtually identical PSG frameworks and analyses.61 
One judge expressed the sentiment of many during this period: “The 
dearth of case law available to me in reaching . . . a decision regarding this 
particular situation is certainly problematic.”62  The lack of precedent on 
point, while frustrating, may have boded well for asylum seekers at this 
time, because IJs were forced to grapple with relevant existing precedent 
that was generally positive towards the asylum seeker. 
2. June 12, 1999 – January 19, 2001: CGRS database case outcomes
after the BIA issues a precedential opinion on DV asylum in
Matter of R-A-
The CGRS database recorded twelve outcomes during this period (five 
denials and seven grants).  In all of the written opinions recorded in the 
database,63 denials and grants alike, the judges acknowledge as binding the 
Board’s decision in Matter of R-A-.  But the IJs reached different results in 
applying this precedent. 
a. Denials
With respect to the denials, four of the five opinions cited the 
applicant’s failure to proffer a cognizable social group as the basis for the 
denial.64  The judges determined that the Board’s decision foreclosed a 
domestic violence asylum claim because it was not fundamentally different 
from the claim presented in R-A-.65  As one IJ stated, “this Court finds the 
abuse suffered by the Respondent to be deplorable beyond words. 
However, Congress, in its wisdom, has not deigned to make abusive 
personal relationships, no matter how disturbing, one of the grounds upon 
which asylum may be granted.”66 
60. CGRS Database Case #58 (1998).
61. CGRS Database Cases #35 (1996); #59 (1996); #47 (1997).
62. CGRS Database Case #845 (1995).
63. Written decisions were on file for seven of the twelve cases (four denials and three
grants). 
64. CGRS Database Cases #132 (1999); #313(1999); #491 (2000); #3487 (2000).  The
fifth case was denied on evidentiary grounds: the IJ held the applicant failed to establish that 
her husband harmed her because of her political opinion and failed to demonstrate well-
founded fear because she had returned to Guatemala to visit her children on more than one 
occasion.  The applicant also advanced a PSG argument, but the IJ’s treatment of this claim 
is not clear from the database information.  CGRS Database Case #3413 (2000). 
65. CGRS Database Cases #132 (1999); #3487 (2000).
66. CGRS Database Case #132 (1999).
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b. Grants
Notwithstanding the Board’s opinion in R-A-, however, six asylum 
seekers received grants of asylum in domestic violence cases during this 
period.  The outcomes were based on DV-PO (two cases), DV-PSG + DV-
PO (two), DV-PSG (one), and religion (one).  In one case where CGRS has 
a written opinion, the judge rejected the Board’s PSG analysis in R-A- and 
held that the group “Mexican women married to and domestically abused 
by Mexican public officials or those charged with protecting the public” 
was cognizable.67  The IJ reached this conclusion by determining that the 
BIA’s decision in Matter of S-A-68 (holding that the father persecuted the 
daughter on account of her liberal Muslim beliefs concerning the proper 
role of women in Moroccan society) conflicted with the Board’s nexus 
analysis in R-A- and therefore controlled because it was later in time.69  In 
another case, the IJ followed the Board with respect to its PSG analysis in 
R-A-, but granted on the basis of political opinion by distinguishing the
cases on the facts.  The judge distinguished from the PO analysis in R-A-,
reasoning that, unlike Ms. Alvarado, the applicant established that her
boyfriend beat her in response to her assertions of independence,
establishing an imputed political opinion motive for the persecution.70
The CGRS database also includes one grant of CAT relief in a 
domestic violence case while R-A- was in effect.  In that case, the 
applicant’s husband was a high-ranking military official in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo.71  The IJ originally denied asylum, rejecting the 
PSG “Congolese women who are abused by their spouses in a society that 
condones DV” as well as the domestic violence-related political opinion. 
The BIA affirmed, but later granted the applicant’s motion to reopen to 
apply for Convention relief.  On remand, the IJ held that the abuse she had 
suffered rose to the level of torture—her husband raped her and infected 
her with a sexually transmitted disease, broke and knocked out her teeth, 
and caused several other injuries during beatings—and held that her 
husband had been “cloaked” with immunity by the government.  Of note, 
67. CGRS Database Case #494 (2000).
68. Matter of S-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1328 (BIA 2000).
69. The IJ reasoned that if the Board’s reasoning in its R-A- decision—that the husband
beat her because she was his wife, not on account of social group—had been applied to the 
facts in S-A-, “the respondent in [S-A-] would have been denied relief because it is just as 
logical to argue that her father abused her because she was his daughter as it was that he did 
so on account of her religious beliefs.”  CGRS Database Case #494 (2000). 
70. The immigration service appealed to the BIA in that case assailing the applicant’s
credibility and challenging the IJ’s conclusion that the Guatemalan government was unable 
or unwilling to protect her.  The BIA dismissed the service’s appeal finding “no error in the 
Immigration Judge’s grant of asylum.”  CGRS Database Case #503 (1999). 
71. CGRS Database Case #117 (2000).
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the Board thereafter dismissed the immigration service’s appeal and 
affirmed the immigration judge’s decision.72  
3. January 20, 2001 – February 19, 2004: CGRS database case
outcomes decided after Matter of R-A- was vacated
After AG Reno vacated the BIA’s decision in R-A-, the CGRS database 
recorded significantly more case outcomes: twenty-two denials and thirty 
grants.73 
a. Denials
In contrast to the decisions issued between 1999 and 2001, the 
decisions denying relief in domestic violence cases on file with CGRS 
during this period largely lack legal analysis and fail to recognize the 
significance of the action taken by the AG in Matter of R-A-.74  The most 
frequently cited reasons for denials issued during this period were lack of a 
cognizable social group (twelve occurrences), failure to demonstrate nexus 
(seven), no political opinion (seven), and no showing of government 
inability or unwillingness to protect (six). 
Some judges who denied relief did so with very little reasoning, simply 
stating that they do not believe domestic violence is a basis for asylum. 
One IJ merely listed the general elements asylum applicants must show and 
then, without further explanation, concluded that “the Court does not find 
that the respondent has met the burden of showing that the problem that she 
faces would be one of the five reasons given in the Act [sic].”75  Similarly, 
72. CGRS Database Case #117 (2000).
73. Written opinions were on file for the majority of the cases (thirty-eight out of the
fifty-two). 
74. Groups rejected during this period included:
 Women from [country X].  CGRS Database Cases #1114 (2001) (Albania); #1290
(2003) (Honduras). 
 Women in an abusive relationship.  CGRS Database Case #1274 (2002).
 Women opposed to male dominance.  CGRS Database Case #818 (2002).
 Women from Guinea who have been abused by their husband and oppose such
practice.  CGRS Database Case #713 (2002). 
 Women who are violently abused by their partners; and women who would not
submit to their partner’s control.  CGRS Database Case #889 (2002). 
 Mexican women and children who experience domestic violence.  CGRS Database
Case #1223 (2004). 
 Women married to Guatemalan men with powerful connections in the government.
CGRS Database Case #1195 (2003). 
 Women who have cohabitated and share a child with powerfully connected members
of drug cartels in Mexico; and battered female in Mexico who is not protected in 
that country.  CGRS Database Case #3191 (2003). 
75. CGRS Database Case #723 (2001); see also CGRS Database Case #3346 (2003)
(holding the applicant did not establish the violence she suffered was on account of her 
membership in a PSG because “[i]t looks like the violence [the applicant] suffered was on 
account of the fact that her husband was an abusive individual who was an alcoholic and for 
whatever reasons that only God knows he was abusive of her and violent with her and other 
people”).  
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without citing any case law or providing any clear reasoning, a judge held 
that, although the applicant “may have been in an abusive relationship” in 
Mexico, “this does not constitute one of the five previously enumerated 
grounds on which relief may be granted.”76  Another IJ took note of the 
existence of proposed regulations on point, but then rejected them with 
little basis, holding:  
domestic violence is private in nature and is not the type of 
politically motivated harm entitled to international protection 
under the Refugee Law.  While the United States has recognized 
the possibility that women such as the respondent [a Honduran 
woman whose partner raped and battered her severely, infecting 
her with HIV], could be refugees, it has not granted refugee status 
to such women in any currently valid published opinion or 
decision.77   
The IJ could have turned to analogous case law (such as Kasinga, 
Acosta, or Fatin), as some judges had done prior to the BIA’s 1999 
decision in R-A-, but instead cited only to the absence of precedent directly 
on point.  In another case, the judge correctly cited to Kasinga as relevant 
authority for evaluating a claim based on a gender-related social group. 
But the IJ denied asylum, baldly stating that “[i]t is the opinion of the Court 
that the respondent has failed to meet the criteria set forth by the [BIA] to 
be qualified for relief in this regard.”78 
Where more rigorous legal analysis appears in denying relief, judges 
demonstrate an erroneous understanding of precedent or ignorance of the 
law to the detriment of the asylum seeker.  For example, one judge 
incorrectly reads the BIA’s decision in R-A- as briefly establishing “an 
opportunity for domestic violence to be a viable claim” before it was 
vacated.  As such, the IJ concludes that, since R-A- is no longer binding, 
domestic violence “is no longer a basis upon which a claim can lie.”79  The 
opposite is in fact true: R-A- briefly established a period when the viability 
of DV claims was called into doubt, but that negative decision had been 
vacated, leaving a void for how to treat these cases.  In another case, an IJ 
found that the Board’s reasoning in R-A- still held persuasive authority, 
despite vacatur, because the proposed regulations of the Department of 
Justice (DOJ) “closely examine” the R-A- opinion and “incorporate the 
Board’s considerations as factors that may be relevant in some cases.”80  
This IJ, however, failed to mention or consider that the stated purpose of 
the DOJ’s proposed rule was precisely to overcome the barriers posed by 
R-A- to granting relief in DV cases.
76. CGRS Database Case #1274 (2001).
77. CGRS Database Case #1290 (2003).
78. CGRS Database Case #1114 (2001).
79. CGRS Database Case #1258 (2003).
80. CGRS Database Case #818 (2002).
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To reject gender-defined social groups, some immigration judges relied 
on the Second Circuit’s opinion in Gomez v. INS, which states that 
“[p]ossession of broadly-based characteristics such as youth and gender 
will not by itself endow individuals with membership in a particular social 
group.”81  In so doing, the IJs chose the most restrictive reading of 
Gomez.82  Moreover, these IJs cited to Gomez with no discussion of the 
developments in R-A- or the proposed gender regulations that are more on 
point in DV cases, even if nonbinding.83 
Other judges looked to a 1975 Board opinion, Matter of Pierre,84 
affirming denial of withholding to Haitian woman who feared persecution 
at the hands of her husband, to support their rejection of domestic violence 
claims as persecution based on personal motives.85  Although Pierre is 
relevant to other domestic violence claims because it involves intimate 
partner violence, IJs looked to this opinion to the exclusion of intervening 
developments in gender-asylum and asylum law more generally, most 
notably the enactment of the 1980 Refugee Act and the Acosta and Kasinga 
decisions.  Moreover, judges glossed over a significant distinguishing 
factor from Pierre.  In Pierre, the Board found that the applicant did not 
establish that she would be persecuted on account of race, religion, political 
opinion or membership in a particular social group and that the applicant 
presented no evidence that the Haitian government “would not intervene to 
prevent or punish” her husband’s acts.86  In contrast, the applicants in the 
cases recorded in the CGRS database proffer PSGs defined by nationality, 
gender, and marital status consistent with Acosta and Kasinga. 
A more reasoned denial from this period involved a woman from 
Jordan.87  The IJ recognized that both the BIA’s opinion in R-A- and the 
81. Gomez v. INS, 947 F.2d 660, 664 (2d Cir. 1991).
82. The sweeping pronouncement in Gomez about gender-defined PSGs has been viewed
as dicta and criticized for departing from Acosta without appropriate deference to the 
agency as required under principles of U.S. administrative law.  See Gao v. Gonzales, 440 
F.3d 62, 69-70 (2d Cir. 2006), vacated on other grounds; see also Koudriachova v.
Gonzales, 490 F.3d 255, 262 (2d Cir. 2007) (“we have recently clarified that the best
reading of Gomez is one that is consistent with Acosta”); Matter of A-M-E- & J-G-U-, 24 I.
& N. Dec. 69, 75 n.7 (BIA 2007) (recognizing that the Second Circuit has distanced itself
from Gomez and affirmed Acosta).  An IJ based in a jurisdiction outside of the Second
Circuit similarly relied on Gomez to foreclose all PSGs defined by broad characteristics
such as age and gender.  CGRS Database Case #1074 (2004).  Gomez is now properly read
as having to do more with the likelihood of persecution than the cognizability of the social
group at issue.  See Koudriachova, 490 F.3d at 262.
83. A New York immigration judge relied on Gomez to reject a social group defined in
part by gender, “women violently abused by partners.” The IJ also took issue with the 
circularity of the proffered social group, in that it was in part defined by the harm suffered, 
and concluded that the harm was “interpersonal, and, although lamentable, not cognizable 
under principles of asylum law.”  CGRS Database Case #889 (2002). 
84. Matter of Pierre, 15 I. & N. Dec. 461 (BIA 1975).
85. CGRS Database Cases #1223 (2003); #1279 (2003).
86. Pierre, 15 I. & N. Dec. at 462.
87. CGRS Database Case #1271 (2002).
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Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Aguirre-Cervantes v. INS, holding that family 
could constitute a cognizable social group,88 had been vacated, leaving a 
void of applicable standards in domestic violence cases.  To fill the void, 
the IJ looked to the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Rodas-Mendoza v. INS,89 
holding that substantial evidence supported the BIA’s finding that rape was 
an isolated, random act of violence “untethered” to the government.90  In 
another case, a judge rejected as circular the applicant’s PSG—defined by 
the IJ as “women in Nicaragua who are considered chattels by their 
husbands and ex-husbands and subjugated”—because it was defined in part 
by the persecution.91 
b. Grants
By contrast, the IJs who granted relief during this period employed 
sophisticated analyses of existing precedent and secondary authorities to 
recognize domestic violence-related social groups and political opinions. 
The majority of the grants, twenty-four out of thirty, rested on DV-PSG or 
DV-PSG + DV-PO.92  Judges generally looked to some combination of the
88. Aguirre-Cervantes v. INS, 242 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 2001).
89. Rodas-Mendoza v. INS, 246 F.3d 1237 (9th Cir. 2001).
90. Significantly, this IJ has later granted relief in DV cases.  See CGRS Database Cases
#2487 (2004); #3064 (2005); #5369 (2008).  
91. The IJ also rejected political opinion reasoning that the applicant’s political
opinion—a belief in gender equality—did not start until after the abuse had already begun. 
CGRS Database Case #8747 (2003).  As mentioned below, the applicant appealed and, in 
June 2009, the Board remanded the case to the IJ in light of R-A-.  The IJ recertified his 
2003 denial and the case is again pending before the Board. 
92. Groups accepted during this period included:
 Mexican women who hold beliefs contrary to established social norms; women who
seek to divorce their abusive spouses; women who seek protection from the 
government from their abusive spouses; and female member of her own family, 
headed by a man whose goal is to control and dominate its members.  CGRS 
Database Case #222 (2002). 
 Ivorian Muslim women who have suffered spousal abuse at the hands of their
husbands and who are perceived as having disgraced their husbands by obtaining 
a divorce and failing to conform to the subservient role of women in the Ivory 
Coast.  CGRS Database Case #614.   
 Women in Guatemalan society who resist male domination by living independently
and self-sufficiently.  CGRS Database Case #813 (2003). 
 Women in Peru who try to escape domestic violence, but are unable to receive
official protection.  CGRS Database Case #2572 (2004). 
 Women suffering domestic violence in Costa Rica who have chosen to resist that
violence by various means, including resort to government protection.  CGRS 
Database Case #2528 (2003).  
 Honduran women who believe that marriage is an equal partnership, and whose
husbands are Honduran men who believe they have a right to dominate their 
wives through any means, including violence.  CGRS Database Case #1204 
(2003). 
 Husband’s immediate family, and Guatemalan women who have been intimately
involved with Guatemalan male companions who believe that women are to live 
under male domination.  CGRS Database Case #1193 (2003).   
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DOJ proposed regulations, the Board’s opinions in Kasinga and Acosta, 
and other precedent from the Courts of Appeals, including Fatin, to 
recognize groups defined by gender, nationality, family membership, 
and/or opposition to a social practice or beliefs about women’s role in 
society.93  At least one IJ reversed course from her previous position in 
domestic violence cases to grant asylum.94  While R-A- was in effect, the IJ 
had denied asylum to a Mexican woman fleeing domestic violence for 
failure to demonstrate nexus to a protected ground (though the IJ had 
granted CAT relief given the likelihood of severe harm without State 
protection).  The applicant appealed the denial of asylum.  After R-A- was 
vacated, the Board remanded the case and, in 2003, the IJ granted asylum 
to the applicant on grounds of DV-PSG.   
In two cases, judges granted asylum on religious grounds without 
considering the applicants’ PSG arguments.95  Both cases involved women 
from Muslim countries, Uganda and Indonesia, whose partners held 
fundamentalist beliefs regarding the role of women.  The IJs analogized 
their decisions to the Board’s opinion in Matter of S-A, where the Board 
found religious persecution in the context of a father/daughter family 
relationship.   
In addition, some IJs found that the record supported feminist PO as a 
ground for asylum.96  The judges found that the applicants demonstrated 
their political opinion against male dominance through their actions—
engaging in physical resistance of abuse, filing for protective orders, and 
seeking help—and that the motive of the persecutor was established by the 
fact that the abuse escalated after a woman asserted such resistance.97 
 Women in Mexico, and women who try to escape domestic violence, but are unable
to receive official protection in Mexico.  CGRS Database Case #1194 (2002). 
Immediate family members of the applicant’s abuser. CGRS Database Case #2700 
(2003). 
93. Other precedent included Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084 (9th Cir. 2000)
(recognizing gender defined social group, “gay men with female sexual identities in 
Mexico” as cognizable), Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571 (9th Cir. 1986) (defining a 
PSG as “a collection of people closely affiliated with each other, who are actuated by some 
common impulse or interest” and recognizing family defined PSG), and Chen v. INS, 289 
F.3d 1113, 1115 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that a nuclear family is a “prototypical example”
of a PSG).  See also CGRS Database Cases #813 (2003); #222 (2002); #614 (2001); #2700
(2003); #990 (2002); #1043 (2001).
94. CGRS Database Case #313 (2003).
95. CGRS Database Cases #792 (2001); #789 (2002).
96. CGRS Database Cases #1043 (2001); #222 (2002).
97. Such actions, one IJ explained, are “counter to cultural traditions of male dominance
and third-party non-involvement in the personal affairs of couples.”  This IJ also concluded 
that legislation attempting to address domestic violence in Costa Rica did not render the 
applicant ineligible for asylum.  Rather, the IJ considered the legislation as evidence in 
support of the existence of the applicant’s political opinion.  By taking advantage of the 
protective measures theoretically available to DV victims under the law, the IJ reasoned that 
she had asserted her support for such measures recognizing women as equals.  CGRS 
Database Case #2528 (2003); see also CGRS Database Cases #222 (2002); #195 (2002). 
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This period highlights the disparities in outcomes in cases presenting 
very similar facts and legal theories where no guidance is available.  While 
some judges accepted social groups defined in part by domestic violence or 
characteristics of the persecutor relying on precedent from gender-related 
cases, other IJs rejected the same, relying on precedent that had been 
vacated such as R-A- that was issued prior to enactment of the Refugee Act 
such as Pierre, or that included harmful dicta such as Gomez. 
c. BIA
The Board recognized the viability of domestic violence asylum cases 
in an unpublished opinion on file with CGRS during this period.98  In that 
case, the BIA overturned an IJ’s adverse credibility finding, determining 
that the judge could not fault the applicant for failing to raise domestic 
violence in her initial application filed in 1993, as domestic violence was 
not recognized as a basis for asylum at the time.  The Board ultimately 
granted asylum on a ground unrelated to domestic violence,99 but its 
analysis seems to suggest that applicants can (and should) raise domestic 
violence as a basis for relief.  The importance of this decision is limited, 
however, given that it was not published. 
4. February 20, 2004 – September 25, 2008: CGRS database case
outcomes after DHS announced its position in DV asylum cases in
Matter of R-A-
After DHS submitted its 2004 brief in R-A-, the CGRS database 
recorded increasing numbers of case outcomes: sixteen denials and forty-
three grants of relief (thirty-nine asylum and four withholding).100  CGRS 
also observed cases where IJs administratively closed or continued 
domestic violence asylum cases during this period pending the issuance of 
regulations or a precedential decision in R-A-.101 
a. Denials
Interestingly, some of the IJs who denied relief during this period 
recognized social groups similar to that advanced by DHS in R-A- as a 
basis for asylum (though not always citing to DHS’s brief), but denied the 
claims on other grounds.102  One judge moved from a categorical rejection 
98. CGRS Database Case #1289 (2003).
99. The applicant had also raised an antigovernment political opinion claim for relief.
100. Written decisions were on file for thirty-three of the cases.
101. Frydman, Recent Developments, supra note 34, at 9.
102. For example, one IJ found that a PSG based on gender, nationality and status in the
relationship, “Salvadorian women in intimate relationships who cannot leave the
relationship,” was cognizable.  But the IJ determined that the applicant was not a member of
the group because the applicant only lived with her partner for about three months and
“[h]er alleged relationship with him does not appear to have the same characteristics of a
marriage, which would under other circumstances have been an immutable characteristic
because of cultural and societal constraints.”  CGRS Database Case #2918 (2007).  Other
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of domestic violence asylum claims in 2003, when he held that domestic 
violence is a private matter and is not “entitled to international 
protection,”103 to a basic recognition in 2008 that the group “married 
Mexican women who resist their abusers but are unable to leave their 
husbands” might be cognizable.104  This trend represented a shift from 
previous periods in which denials depended almost entirely on a failure to 
recognize domestic violence asylum as a more general matter.   
Other judges continued to reject domestic violence-related social 
groups, at times ignoring the DHS position in R-A-, and at others 
misinterpreting the position.105  For example, in one case the judge held 
that the proffered social group, “married or previously married women in 
Croatia who are unable to leave the relationship,” was not cognizable 
because it did not exist independently of the persecution.106  The IJ refused 
to consider as relevant the DHS brief in R-A-, stating that “[t]he brief has 
not been adopted by any agency as authoritative and the Court will not use 
it now to support a finding that [the applicant] has established membership 
in a particular social group.”107 
In another case, the IJ held that the PSG “married Haitian women 
unable to leave the relationship” was not cognizable because it did not 
share a common immutable characteristic given that Haitian women could 
“divorce with relative ease.”108  The IJ erroneously cited to the DHS brief 
in R-A- for this holding, failing to grapple with the agency’s statement in its 
judges denied for failure to demonstrate membership in the group or failure to show 
government inability or unwillingness to protect.  See CGRS Database Cases #2953 (2004), 
#4087 (2007), #4802 (2008). 
103. CGRS Database Case #1290 (2003).
104. Although the IJ stated that he did not need to reach the question of the validity of the
applicant’s asserted social group in the 2008 decision, denying on other grounds, the judge’s
analysis shows at least some progress from his previous position rejecting DV claims
categorically.   CGRS Database Case #5513 (2008).
105. The following PSGs were also rejected during this period:
 Women who refuse to acquiesce to sex in a domestic relationship.  CGRS Database
Case #2957 (2005). 
 Women in Nicaragua; and women who are victims of abuse both in society at large
and within the home.  CGRS Database Case #4231 (2005). 
 Domestic partners/common-law wives in Guatemala who are unable to leave the
relationship.  CGRS Database Case #8002 (2007). 
 Battered/abused women.  CGRS Database Cases #3040 (2006); #3837 (2005).
 106. CGRS Database Case #3688 (2006).  The applicant appealed, and the Board
remanded the case.  At the time of writing, the case was pending trial.
 107. In any event, the judge found that the arguments made in the R-A- brief were
inapplicable because the applicant in the case at hand obtained a divorce.  The IJ also held
that the applicant failed to show the government was unable or unwilling to protect her in
part because the government had prosecuted her husband for the rape and murder of another
woman.  Id.; see also CGRS Database Case #2957 (2005) (the IJ did not consider the
applicant’s PSG arguments, and with respect to the political opinion arguments, held that
“no Court has found that a refusal to acquiesce in sexual relationships is a political opinion,”
without looking to R-A-).
108. CGRS Database Case #3029 (2006).
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brief that, even if a woman obtains a divorce, her relationship may still be 
immutable “if the abuser would not recognize a divorce or separation as 
ending the abuser’s right to abuse the victim.”109  Another IJ held that while 
“[i]t is clear that DV is a very significant problem in the [applicant’s home 
country], . . . it does not appear that the respondent’s boyfriend harmed her 
on account of her attempts to leave him or on account of any other 
characteristic . . . other than the fact that she was female and his 
girlfriend.”110  In other words, the judge found that the applicant’s gender 
and status in the relationship, precisely two of the characteristics that 
defined the proffered social group, provided the motive for the persecution, 
but still inexplicably concluded that the applicant failed to demonstrate 
nexus to a protected ground.111 
One case in particular highlighted the refusal of some judges to 
interpret legal developments in favor of applicants.  There, the judge held 
that “[t]he law today regarding gender and domestic violence based asylum 
remains unclear, thus, this Court is unwilling to recognize ‘domestic 
partners/common-law wives in Guatemala who are unable to leave the 
relationship’ as a social group presently cognizable under the Act.”112  
Notably, DHS took a position in that case inconsistent with its position in 
R-A-, arguing that the applicant failed to set forth a cognizable social group
or establish nexus, even though the proffered group was virtually identical
to the group recognized by DHS in its 2004 brief.  Judges who were
reticent to recognize DV-PSG claims as a basis for asylum, however,
seemed to have no trouble granting domestic violence claims based on
religion involving women who resisted Islamic traditions relying on Matter
of S-A-.113
b. Grants
Grants during this period were based on DV-PSG (twenty-eight cases), 
DV-PSG +PO (four), and DV-PO (two).  Many judges who granted relief
followed the DHS framework, although some did so with confusion.  Other
IJs granted relief without following the framework at all.
109. DHS R-A- Br., supra note 28, at 28.
110. CGRS Database Case #4201 (2005).
111. Another opinion provides even more incomprehensible reasoning for denying relief.
The IJ stated: “there was little or no evidence demonstrating that that [sic] what the situation
is, but accepting that this is what the respondent and her spouse have testified to, the fact is
that the lack of a nexus to any of the, any of the factors which could be relied upon with
evidence, or otherwise, is quite dispositive, the respondent’s case failing from an evidentiary
standpoint.”  CGRS Database Case #3377 (2005).
112. CGRS Database Case #8002 (2007).
113. Compare CGRS Database Case #4630 (2007) (granting on religious grounds), with
CGRS Database Case #3837 (denying on PSG grounds) (2005).  Compare CGRS Database
Case #416 (2002) (granting on religious grounds), with CGRS Database Case #1074 (2004)
(denying on PSG grounds).
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Most of the groups that were approved during this period followed the 
R-A- approach and included gender, nationality, and relationship status as
immutable/fundamental characteristics that define the group.114  In addition
to the guidance provided by DHS’s R-A- brief, IJs granting relief also relied
on related precedent from the Board and the Courts of Appeals recognizing
groups defined by gender in different circumstances,  including Kasinga,
Acosta, Fatin, Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, recognizing groups defined by
gender, there “gay men with female sexual identities” in the country of
origin,115 and Mohammed v. Gonzales, recognizing group defined by
gender, there females of a certain clan.116  At least one IJ reversed course
from his previous position of rejecting domestic violence asylum claims.117
114. The following groups were deemed cognizable:
 Married women in [country X] who are unable to leave the relationship.  CGRS
Database Cases #3408 (2006) (Guatemala); #3474 (2006) (Peru); #3587 (2006) 
(Mongolia). 
 Women in Peru who are unable to leave their intimate relationships.  CGRS Database
Case #3033 (2005). 
 Women in Cambodia who have been raped and abused domestically and whose
governments are unable or unwilling to protect them.  CGRS Database Case #641 
(2004).   
 Married or formerly married Chinese (Christian) women in Indonesia who are unable
to avail themselves of the protection of Indonesian law.  CGRS Database Case 
#3186 (2005).   
 Women in Mexico who are married to abusive husbands, are opposed to such
treatment and are unable to leave the relationship.  CGRS Database Case #4133 
(2005). 
 Honduran women who are abused by their spouses, who think of them as property,
and who are unable to leave the relationship.  CGRS Database Case #2532 (2006).  
 Honduran women who are abused by their spouses, who think of the women as their
property, and who are unable to leave the relationship.  CGRS Database Case 
#2532 (2006). 
 Honduran women who have been in an intimate relationship with a man who believes
in imposing domination over women by force.  CGRS Database Case #4081 
(2007).     
 Honduran women unable to leave their husbands who exercise domination over their
lives.  CGRS Database Case #5477 (2008).  
 Married women in a culture that implicitly condones violence against women.  CGRS
Database Case #2978 (2008). 
 Mexican women unable to leave an abusive (marital) partnership due to familial
relationship.  CGRS Database Case #5145 (2008). 
In addition, judges granted relief based on religion (three cases), FGC (five), and non-DV 
political opinion (one); however, CGRS does not have written opinions on file so it was not 
possible to understand why or how the IJs disposed of the DV arguments advanced by the 
applicants, so they will not be discussed in detail.  See CGRS Database Cases #2625 (2004) 
(FGC); #2857 (2004) (FGC); #4031 (2006) (FGC); #3163 (2007) (FGC); #5338 (2008) 
(FGC); #3773 (2006) (religion); #4630 (2007) (religion); #4673 (2007) (religion); #4200 
(2005) (political opinion). 
115. Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084 (9th Cir. 2000).
116. Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785 (9th Cir. 2005).
117. Compare CGRS Database Case #1271 (2002), with CGRS Database Cases #2487
(2004) (granting relief on joint remand from the Board), #3064 (2005) (giving “considerable
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Another judge, who had granted asylum in a domestic violence case before 
DHS filed its 2004 brief on the basis of a family-defined social group, 
changed her analysis during this period to focus on the DHS formulation.118 
IJs who followed R-A-, however, did not escape confusion.  For 
example, one judge explicitly recognized in his opinion that a social group 
“must exist independently of the persecution suffered by the applicant for 
asylum” and that under existing case law, gender and “domestic status” 
may constitute immutable characteristics that define a group in a domestic 
violence case.119  Nevertheless, in the concluding paragraph of his opinion, 
the IJ stated that the applicant should be granted asylum as a member of a 
PSG comprised of “women who suffer domestic violence,” rather than a 
group, as outlined elsewhere in the opinion, defined by gender, nationality, 
and status in the relationship.  DHS appealed the grant, arguing that “[t]he 
respondent and the IJ essentially defined the group by the harm that the 
respondent fears,” and that “domestic violence victims” do not constitute a 
cognizable social group.  The case was still pending at the time of 
writing.120 
Not all judges who granted relief, however, followed R-A-.  In one 
case, the DHS attorney argued that the law related to domestic violence 
asylum is “in flux,” and that the applicant’s claim under the CAT was 
“much stronger” than under asylum law.121  The IJ declined to follow the 
DHS attorney’s argument in that case and also declined to follow the 
agency’s position in R-A-.  Relying on precedent recognizing family-
defined groups, the IJ concluded that the DV context should be treated no 
differently from other instances when family members are targeted for 
persecution; the fact that the persecution came from within the family 
rather than without did not change the analysis.  In other cases, IJs 
recognized groups that, unlike the group proffered by DHS in R-A-, 
included a reference to the abuse experienced in the relationship.122  While 
the outcomes were ultimately positive for the applicants in those cases at 
deference” to the DHS position in the R-A- brief), and #5369 (2008) (recognizing that the 
definition of the particular social group term has expanded).   
118. Compare CGRS Database Case #881 (2002), with #3825 (2007).
119. CGRS Database Case #5256 (2008).
120. CGRS filed an amicus brief to the Board in this case urging the Board to reformulate
the PSG and affirm the IJ’s grant without remand.  Under well-settled law, the brief argues
that the BIA reviews de novo the formulation of PSGs and may affirm the grant of asylum
on the basis of a formulation that varies from the group articulated by the IJ.  Once the
Board articulates a cognizable group, it may conclude without remand that the applicant is a
member of that group because all of the facts necessary for making that determination are in
the record and undisputed and the applicant properly raised the PSG issue.  CGRS Database
Case #5256 (CGRS Br. 2011).
121. CGRS Database Case #4133 (2005).
122. See CGRS Database Case #641 (2004) (finding that the past abuse the applicant
suffered in her domestic relationship was a “shared past experience,” that is now
immutable).
 
Winter 2013] DV AS A BASIS FOR ASYLUM 137 
the level of the immigration court, the social groups may have been 
untenable at the appellate level (if DHS contested the grant), because the 
groups recognized by the IJs were in tension with precedent requiring that 
PSGs exist independent of persecution.123  It is unclear from the CGRS 
database whether the IJs in those cases were aware of the DHS position in 
R-A-.  In any event, these cases highlight the marked absence of uniform
guidance.
c. BIA
The database included only one decision from the Board during this 
period.124  Relying on Kasinga, the Board reversed the IJ’s denial of relief 
and granted asylum based on the applicant’s well-founded fear of female 
genital cutting.  The Board did not address the applicant’s claim based on 
domestic violence other than the threat of genital cutting. 
5. September 26, 2008 – July 16, 2009: CGRS database case
outcomes decided after the U.S. Attorney General lifted the stay in
Matter of R-A-
The CGRS database recorded only two denials, one at the IJ level and 
one at the Board, and only one new grant of relief during this period.  The 
CGRS database also included some IJ orders to administratively close or 
continue domestic violence cases pending guidance as well as some BIA 
orders remanding cases to the immigration courts. 
a. Denial
The immigration judge who denied relief during this period held that 
the applicant’s proffered social group was not cognizable.125  Although the 
judge recognized that the group was defined by gender, an immutable 
characteristic, the IJ determined that the group, “Zimbabwean women who 
assert their independence from domineering and abusive male partners, 
including former spouses” lacked “social visibility” and “particularity.” 
The IJ did not cite to the proposed regulations or any of the documents 
associated with the developments in Matter of R-A-.   
b. Grant
One applicant was granted asylum during this period on the basis of her 
membership in a PSG.126  CGRS did not have the opinion on file, so the 
precise contours of the group accepted by the IJ were unknown.  DHS 
waived appeal. 
123. See Lukwago v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 157 (3d Cir. 2003).
124. CGRS Database Case #927 (2004).
125. The IJ also found that the applicant failed to provide sufficient corroboration of her
claim.  CGRS Database Case #5807 (2008).
126. CGRS Database Case #5922 (2009).
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c. BIA
In an unpublished opinion, the Board rejected a social group defined by 
gender, nationality, and status in the relationship on grounds that “such a 
group lacks the elements of ‘social visibility’ and ‘particularity’ . . ., and 
because membership in such a group is not a ‘fundamental’ or immutable 
characteristic.”127  In so doing, as argued by the attorney in the case on 
appeal, the BIA appears to have treated this case differently from the 
broader class of domestic violence cases remanded to IJs for additional fact 
gathering after AG Mukasey lifted the stay during this and the following 
period.128  Moreover, the Board’s reasoning was significant in that it 
rejected the claim in part for failure of the proffered group to meet the 
immutable/fundamental PSG test rather than for the reasons the Board 
rejected Ms. Alvarado’s claim discussed above,129 or for other resistance to 
domestic violence asylum on the basis that domestic violence is personal 
and undeserving of protection as a categorical matter. 
6. July 16, 2009 – December 10, 2009: CGRS database case
outcomes after DHS clarified its position in Matter of L-R-
regarding the viability of DV asylum
In the six months after the DHS brief in L-R- became public, the CGRS 
database recorded five denials and seven grants (six asylum and one 
CAT).130 
a. Denials
IJs who denied relief during this period did so as a result of a 
misunderstanding of the status of R-A- and other related developments as 
well as a lack of guidance on how to treat domestic violence asylum cases. 
Of the denials, one decision especially demonstrates the confusion 
regarding the social group analytical framework for domestic violence 
cases.  The judge, even while recognizing that R-A- had been vacated, still 
relied on the analysis in the R-A- decision to support his reasoning that the 
group, “wom[e]n who have suffered severe domestic abuse at the hands of 
 127. The Board cited other reasons for denial, including credibility and insufficient
evidence to show real or imputed political opinion as a basis for the persecution.  CGRS
Database Case #6655 (2009).
128. Notably, the government initially took the position that only in the context of a
formal marriage could a particular social group exist in a DV case.  However, the
government later switched its position and joined the applicant in a motion to remand to the
IJ, which the Board granted.
129. In R-A-, the Board held that even if the PSG was joined by immutable or fundamental
characteristics in line with Acosta, the group was not “recognized and understood to be a
societal faction.”
130. The database includes three written opinions for the denials, but it did not produce
any written decisions for the grants during this period.
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a known drug trafficker,” was not sufficiently “particular” or “visible.”131  
The judge also found that, even if the PSG is cognizable, the applicant 
failed to demonstrate nexus because her persecutor only harmed her 
because he believed that “she is a woman whom . . . ‘belonged’ to him.” 
The IJ failed to explain how a man’s belief that a woman “belongs” to him 
is anything other than persecution on account of that women’s gender and 
status in a domestic relationship, precisely what DHS argued is sufficient to 
show eligibility for asylum in L-R- and R-A-.132 
In another case on remand from the Board, the IJ reinstated his 
previous order denying relief.133  Although the applicant submitted DHS’s 
briefs from L-R- and R-A- to the court and DHS did not contest the 
existence of a PSG in that case,134 the judge made no mention of these 
intervening developments.  Rather, the IJ concluded that even if the 
applicant were a member of a cognizable PSG, “she has not established a 
nexus between her membership in that group, and the mistreatment she 
received at the hands of her husband.  Neither party has cited to any 
controlling court decisions that articulate this nexus has been established in 
similar cases.”135 
Another opinion issued during this period further evinces the continued 
resistance to domestic violence claims for asylum.  In that case, the judge 
found that the applicant was credible, but then also found that she had not 
established a nexus between the harm she suffered and her membership in a 
PSG, defined as “married women in Guatemala who are unable to leave 
their relationship,” but rather that her abuser “was simply a horrible 
131. The case involved horrific facts; the applicant was kidnapped at age twenty-one, gang
raped repeatedly over the course of several days, and then forced into a relationship with
one of her rapists as a result of threats to kill her family.  CGRS Database Case #3353
(2009).
 132. The Board also denied relief in another case during this period that presents
somewhat different factual circumstances.  There, a woman was tricked into marrying a man
who forced her into prostitution.  In an unpublished opinion, the Board found there was no
nexus because the persecutor mistreated and threatened the applicant not on account of any
protected ground, but rather because she refused to engage in and exposed his criminal
activities.  Moreover, the Board rejected the social group, “Mongolian women who are
forced or sold into prostitution,” finding that the PSG lacked social visibility and
particularity.  The Board did not discuss the relationship between the applicant and her
husband and it does not appear that the relationship was argued by the applicant as a
defining characteristic.  CGRS Database Case #6473 (2009).  In the other case from this
period, an IJ denied relief based on an adverse credibility determination, but did not engage
in a PSG or PO analysis.  CGRS Database Case #6503 (2009).
133. The IJ denied relief in 2003 and the applicant appealed.  The case was held in
abeyance for several years.  In 2009, the Board remanded the case in light of the AG’s order
lifting the stay in Matter of R-A- for “further factual development, including the submission
of new evidence, and for the parties to present argument regarding applicable asylum law to
those facts, and for the entry of a new decision by the [IJ].”  CGRS Database Case #8747
(2009).
134. The DHS in that case argued against a grant of relief by distinguishing the facts from
that of Ms. Alvarado’s case.
135. CGRS Database Case #8747 (2009).
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husband who lacked a basic sense of morality” and that she was just a 
“victim of crime which was perpetrated without reason.”136  This case is 
currently pending before the Board. 
b. Grants
Most of the grants during this period were based on DV-PSG (four 
cases).  The other grants were based on FGC-PSG (one case) and religion 
(one).137  The grants based on PSG followed, at least in part, the groups 
approved by DHS, such as “married women in Nicaragua who are unable 
to leave the relationship.”138  As before, however, not all IJs who granted 
relief accepted the government’s L-R-/R-A- formulation.  For example, in 
one case, the judge rejected the applicant’s proffered groups, including 
“Cameroonian women who are viewed as property within domestic 
relationships by virtue of their gender” and “Cameroonian women who 
have been forced into marriage.”  The judge expressed concern that the 
former was circular, and that the latter did not accurately describe the 
applicant’s experience because her relationship was more akin to “sex 
slavery” than marriage, which the judge considered to be “worse.”139  In the 
end, the IJ determined that the applicant “must” fall within some 
cognizable PSG, based on the abhorrent treatment she suffered, but he 
granted relief without explicitly defining the group.  
An IJ granted CAT relief in another case, but denied asylum and 
withholding, rejecting the group, “Honduran women who are unable to 
leave a relationship with the fathers of their children.”140  Without referring 
to any of the developments in R-A- or L-R-, the IJ found that the group 
lacked “particularity” and “social visibility” and that the applicant’s status 
in the relationship was not immutable because she “did eventually leave 
[her abuser]” to flee to the United States, which “terminat[ed] the 
relationship.”  In the alternative, the judge held that the applicant failed to 
establish nexus: “She was not abused because she was unable to leave the 
relationship.  Rather, she was unable to leave the relationship because she 
136. CGRS Database Case #8767 (2009).
137. CGRS Database Cases #6392 (2009) (religion); #6463 (2009) (FGC).  In the case
where the grant rested on past FGC alone, the applicant suffered severe domestic violence
as well, but the DV was not the basis for the IJ’s reasoning.  It is not clear whether the IJ
considered the DV-PSG arguments, or rather considered them extraneous because the grant
based on FGC was sufficient and held more analytical clarity under Kasinga.
138. CGRS Database Case #6178 (2009).  In addition, the following PSGs were deemed
cognizable:
 Guatemalan women in an intimate relationship who have been subjected to violence
and who assert through their actions their right to be free of violence.  CGRS 
Database Case #5146 (2009).  
 Guatemalan women in intimate relationships with police officers who have been
subjected to violence.  CGRS Database Case #5146 (2009). 
139. CGRS Database Case #6519 (2009).
140. CGRS Database Case #6649 (2009).
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was being abused.  It appears that the abuse suffered by Respondent, 
although tragic, was the result of [her abuser’s] efforts to exert power and 
control over her, not her membership in any particular social group.” 
7. Post-December 11, 2009: CGRS database case outcomes decided
after the IJ granted asylum to Matter of R-A- on remand from the
Board
Since the IJ’s decision granting asylum to Ms. Alvarado,141 as of May 
17, 2012, the CGRS database recorded fifty-eight case outcomes, including 
forty grants of asylum or withholding, two grants of CAT relief, and 
thirteen denials.  The database also recorded three grants of motions to 
reopen to allow women the opportunity to apply for relief in domestic 
violence cases.142 
a. Denials
In cases denying relief since R-A-, some judges have accepted the DHS 
social group framework, but denied asylum or withholding because of the 
applicant’s failure to satisfy the other eligibility criteria such as establishing 
membership in the group.143  At the same time, however, many judges have 
rejected DHS’s approach, expressing skepticism regarding the viability of 
domestic violence as a basis for asylum under any circumstances.144  Some 
judges have also denied relief with no reference to developments in the L-
R- and R-A- cases.145  Other judges have referred to the L-R- and/or R-A- 
141. The most recent decision analyzed for this article was issued on May 17, 2012.  Since
then, CGRS has continued to receive information about outcomes in DV cases on a regular
basis.
142. Written opinions were on file for twenty-six of the cases.
 143. CGRS Database Cases #7436 (2010) (recognizing group defined by gender,
nationality and status in the relationship, but finding that applicant was not a member of the
group because she did not live with her abuser); #8644 (2011) (recognizing group defined
by gender, nationality and status in an abusive relationship, but finding that the applicant
was not a member of the group because she did not try to leave the relationship prior to
leaving the country).
144. CGRS Database Cases #3110 (2010) (denying relief reasoning that all countries are
“not as good” as the United States’ on women’s rights, but “that doesn’t mean that the
United States should grant asylum to all women of the world”); #6550 (2010) (denying
relief again on remand, concluding that nothing had changed since R-A- and continuing to
refuse to recognize PSG asylum in the DV context); #8282 (2012) (rejecting group,
“Honduran women unable to leave a domestic relationship,” and denying relief in part based
on conclusion that “[h]arm resulting from a social problem” does not constitute harm
because of an enumerated ground).
145. The following DV-PSGs were among those rejected during this period:
 Indian women in a domestic relationship and unable to free themselves from their
partners and viewed as property by nature of their position in a domestic 
relationship.  CGRS Database Case #7607 (2011). 
 Kenyan women in a domestic relationship who are unable to leave.  CGRS Database
Case #8491 (2011). 
 Married women in Mongolia who cannot leave marriage.  CGRS Database Case
#6626 (2010). 
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developments, but nevertheless concluded that groups defined by gender, 
nationality, and status in the relationship lack the requisite social visibility 
and particularity.146  One judge, for example, found that while relationship 
status can be immutable, because the plight of women is generally ignored 
by the society, the applicant’s group lacked visibility.147  Similarly, a judge 
rejected the L-R- social group formulations, finding that the group is not 
visible in India because only thirty percent of domestic violence victims 
there seek assistance.148  The IJ’s nexus analysis in that case further 
demonstrates a deep misunderstanding of the context and motivations of 
abusers in the domestic sphere.  There, the applicant argued that her partner 
“attempted to control [her] sexual and reproductive rights by raping her and 
causing a miscarriage” on account of her group membership.  The IJ found 
that the applicant failed to demonstrate nexus, reasoning that “there is 
nothing to indicate that the miscarriage occurred on account of [the 
applicant’s] membership in a particular social group as opposed to 
dissatisfaction with the unpaid dowry, [the persecutor’s] poor character, or 
another unwanted mouth to feed similar to [the applicant’s son],” and “it 
would appear that the alleged rape was part of [the persecutor’s] alleged 
attempt to force [the applicant’s] family into giving him custody of his 
son.”149  Another IJ found that the group “married women in Guatemala 
who are unable to leave the relationship” is impermissibly circular.150 
Some judges have expressed a desire to provide protection for 
applicants in domestic violence cases but conclude that the current state of 
the law constrains them.151  One judge rejected the L-R- social group 
formulations as circular, but stated that if he were writing on a blank slate, 
he would find women in the particular country to be a cognizable group. 
The judge claimed that he could not do so in that case, because he had been 
 Women in abusive relationships in El Salvador who escape the country in order to
flee their abuser.  CGRS Database Case #8644 (2011). 
 Salvadoran women unable to leave domestic relationship.  CGRS Database Case
#6667 (2011). 
In addition to PSG, denials during this period have also been based on no political opinion 
(3 occurrences), no nexus (3), changed country conditions (1), and credibility (2). 
146. CGRS Database Cases #6626 (2010) (rejecting “married women in Mongolia who
cannot leave the marriage”); #7186 (2010).
147. CGRS Database Case #8491 (2011).
148. CGRS Database Case #7607 (2011).
149. Id.
 150. This IJ also found that even if the PSG was cognizable, the applicant had not
established she was a member of the group because, contrary to DHS’s position in R-A-, she
could not show that she was unable to leave, reasoning that she had left three times before,
including her flight to the United States, despite her husband’s refusal to divorce her.
CGRS Database Case #7186 (2010).
151. See CGRS Database Case #7186 (2010) (“Although the respondent presents a
sympathetic case for expansion of current law regarding asylum, the Court holds that, based
upon the facts in this case, the prevailing law in the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals does
not recognize as a basis for asylum the respondent’s claim based upon domestic abuse by a
spouse or former spouse in the respondent’s country of origin.”).
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rebuffed by the Board in other cases where he had taken the gender plus 
nationality approach.  As such, the IJ stated that he would continue to deny 
relief in the current state of the law cases until further guidance came back 
from the Board.152  In another case, the IJ rejected a gender-defined group 
in a DV case, but explicitly urged the attorney to appeal the decision, 
hoping that it would result in a precedential decision from the Board.153  
The judge indicated that he was sympathetic towards the plight of the 
applicant, but stated that he “did not believe the action of one man on his 
own” equated to persecution deserving of asylum protection.154   
b. Grants
Despite lingering resistance, it is clear that the developments in R-A- 
and L-R- have made a significant impact on decision-making in domestic 
violence asylum cases across the country.  In many cases, judges have 
accepted the DHS framework and recognized groups that include some 
combination of the L-R- characteristics of gender, nationality, and status in 
the relationship, and have moved away from groups defined by the 
persecution suffered.155  The majority of the asylum and withholding grants 
during this period were based on DV-PSG (thirty-six out of the forty).  The 
remaining cases were based on DV-PSG + DV-PO (two cases).  Of 
considerable importance, the CGRS database contains a grant of asylum in 
a case that advanced DV-PSG as the basis for asylum before an IJ in the 
Eloy, Arizona immigration court.156  This is believed to be the first ever 
152. CGRS Database Case #6667 (2011).
153. The case is still pending.  CGRS Database Case #8541 (2012).
 154. Id.
155. The following PSGs were accepted during this period:
 Women in [country X] who are unable to leave a domestic relationship.  CGRS
Database Cases #8683 (2012); #8370 (2012); #8203 (2012); #7571 (2012); #7548 
(2011); 6269 (2011); #8054 (2011); #7668 (2011); #6291 (2010); #5562 (2011); 
#6161 (2010); #6127 (2010); #7074 (2010); #6748 (2010). 
 Women in [country X] in domestic relationships who are viewed as property by
virtue of their positions within a domestic relationship.  CGRS Database Cases 
#7661 (2011); #6161 (2010); #7484 (2011); #7668 (2011); #6748 (2010); #8054 
(2011). 
 Nicaraguan women whose domestic partners view them as property and refuse to let
them leave the relationship.  CGRS Case #6142 (2010). 
 Married Guatemalan women and/or women who are in a domestic relationship who
resist their abusers but are unable to leave the relationship.  CGRS Database Case 
#7520 (2011). 
 Women in Honduras who are in a domestic relationship with a police officer.  CGRS
Database Case #8517 (2012). 
 Female members of the Bulu tribe who oppose polygamy.  CGRS Database Case
#5204. 
 Family relationship.  CGRS Database Case #5326 (2010).
156. CGRS Database Case #6394 (2010).
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domestic violence case granted in that jurisdiction, which had heretofore 
been particularly resistant to these cases.157 
Nevertheless, there are still some judges who have granted relief on 
rationales independent from the DHS approach.  In one case, for example, 
the applicant and DHS stipulated to the L-R- “unable to leave” and “viewed 
as property” formulations of the social group.  However, to grant relief the 
judge reformulated the group based on gender, nationality, and the 
applicant’s shared experiences of having been used as sex slave in Liberia, 
having borne children as a result of rape, and having escaped from 
enslavement.158  One IJ has been willing to grant CAT relief in domestic 
violence cases, but has denied asylum or withholding, rejecting social 
groups proffered by applicants who follow the R-A-/L-R- framework.  The 
IJ has rejected DV-PSGs with little analysis, simply stating in one case that 
the group was not cognizable because the Board’s R-A- decision was 
vacated and there was no binding precedent from the Board or the Court of 
Appeals,159 and stating in another case that “the particular social group of 
which the [applicant] claims to be a member . . . is overly broad and is 
undeserving of relief under the INA.”160 
c. DHS position
In some cases, DHS trial attorneys have followed the agency’s 
approach in L-R- and R-A-, filing joint motions to remand from the Board 
and then declining to contest a grant of relief for the applicant.161  In other 
cases, DHS attorneys have made arguments to immigration judges and the 
Board that are inconsistent with the agency’s position in L-R- and R-A-.162  
For example, a DHS attorney in Pennsylvania argued against a grant of 
relief in the immigration court, stating that domestic violence can never 
give rise to a cognizable PSG for asylum.  The IJ in that case rejected the 
DHS attorney’s argument and directed the attorney to revisit the agency’s 
position set forth in its 2009 brief in L-R-.163  A DHS attorney in Texas 
appealed a grant of asylum, contesting the IJ’s holding that the abuse 
suffered by the applicant at the hands of her common-law husband was on 
account of her membership in a PSG identical to the L-R-/R-A- groups, 
157. For example, in another Eloy case, the IJ denied asylum and the applicant appealed.
While the matter was pending before the Board, the attorney and DHS filed a joint motion
stipulating to a grant of asylum and seeking a remand to the IJ on that basis.  On remand, the
DHS attorney explained that the agency believed that the applicant was a member of a PSG
and qualified for asylum, but the IJ stated that nothing had changed in the law and denied
the case again.  CGRS Database Case #8350 (2012).
158. CGRS Database Case #7535 (2012).
159. CGRS Database Case #8787 (2012).  This IJ has granted asylum in DV cases, but
only where based on FGC or relief.  See CGRS Database Case #7485 (2012); #6392 (2009).
160. CGRS Database Case #8823 (2012).
161. CGRS Database Case #7758 (2011).
162. CGRS Database Case #7186 (2010).
163. CGRS Database Case #6127 (2010).
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“Honduran women who are unable to leave their domestic relationship.”164  
The case is still pending.  In another case pending before the BIA,165 the 
attorney for the applicant contacted DHS in San Francisco to see if the 
agency would consider withdrawing its opposition to the applicant’s appeal 
in light of its position in L-R-.  The DHS attorney declined withdrawal, 
stating that DHS was “not estopped” from taking a position that differs 
from the L-R- brief because the brief was filed by a different branch of the 
agency.  
Although many DHS attorneys have not objected to an applicant’s 
submission of the agency’s L-R- and R-A- briefs,166 some have objected, 
citing confidentiality concerns.167  For example, in one case, DHS argued 
that the L-R- brief attached to an applicant’s motion to reopen had not been 
redacted of identifying information and therefore declined to “remark upon 
the document further as to do so could constitute a violation of the asylum 
confidentiality regulations.”168  DHS attorneys have objected to the 
inclusion of the L-R- materials in some cases notwithstanding a letter sent 
from Ms. L.R.’s counsel to the agency indicating that Ms. L.R. “authorized 
the disclosure” of the redacted briefs and other materials submitted in her 
case.169 
d. BIA
The Board has had several opportunities to clarify the law of domestic 
violence asylum, but it has repeatedly dodged the issue.  In an unpublished 
decision issued in January 2012, the Board acknowledged that whether 
domestic violence may be the basis for an asylum claim “remains 
164. CGRS Database Case #7074 (2010).
165. In that case, the IJ initially denied asylum in 2008 on the basis that the applicant had
failed to show the government of Nicaragua was unable or unwilling to protect her, though
the IJ did recognize the proffered social group as cognizable.  The applicant had appealed
the unable/unwilling ruling; and the government opposed arguing, among other things, that
even if the unable/unwilling ruling was overturned, the applicant was not a member of a
cognizable social group.  CGRS Database Case #4802 (2008).
166. CGRS Database Case #6161 (2010).
167. CGRS Database Case #6731 (2011).
168. CGRS Database Case #6473 (2010).
169. Letter from Karen Musalo, CGRS Director and U.C. Hastings Clinical Professor of
Law, to David A. Martin, Principal Deputy General Counsel, Office of the General Counsel,
DHS (Aug. 9, 2010) (on file with author).  The agency responded to this letter, stating that
the letter had been forwarded to leadership within the agency to make sure that DHS
attorneys in field offices understand DHS’s “legal policy and the importance of taking
litigation positions consistent with that legal policy.”  Letter from David A. Martin to Karen
Musalo (Sept. 30, 2010) (on file with author).  However, in the response letter, DHS also
stated that it “discourage[s]” the submission of briefs in unrelated cases “[b]ecause each
case should be argued on its own merits.”  Id.  But, it should be noted that the regulations
governing disclosure of information pertaining to an asylum application, like the briefs in R-
A-and  L-R-, do not apply to instances where a U.S. government official “need[s] to examine
information in connection with . . . adjudication of asylum applications.”  8 C.F.R. §
1208.6(c)(1)(i).
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unresolved.”170  Rather than issue a decision setting forth its interpretation 
of the statute, the Board determined that even if domestic violence could be 
the basis for asylum, the applicant had no well-founded fear, because the 
evidence in the case indicated that her abuser was living in the United 
States.  The Board also granted asylum in a domestic violence case in 
which DHS had stipulated to a grant, but it did so in a one-sentence order 
with no analysis.171 
Significantly, however, the Board granted two motions to reopen 
during this period to afford women the opportunity to apply for asylum on 
the basis of domestic violence.172  In one case, the Board had previously 
denied an applicant’s motion to reopen, holding that there had been no 
ineffective assistance of counsel, one of the potential bases for reopening, 
where the applicant failed to raise the domestic violence asylum claim 
during her court proceedings in 1999 because domestic violence was not 
legally viable at that time.173  Then, in 2011, the Board granted the 
applicant’s second motion to reopen sua sponte, using its powers to 
overcome the time and numerical limitations imposed on such motions.174  
The BIA also utilized its sua sponte powers to reopen one other case on file 
during this period.  There, the applicant had not initially filed for asylum 
based on domestic violence because she was in immigration proceedings 
with her husband, so she later sought to have her case reopened after her 
husband was deported.175 
CGRS is aware of several domestic violence asylum cases that, as of 
the date of writing, have been fully briefed and are pending before the 
Board awaiting decision.  In one pending case, the Board sought 
supplemental briefing from the parties and amicus curiae briefs to address 
“whether domestic violence can, in some instances, form the basis of an 
asylum or withholding of removal claim.”176  Although it is possible that a 
published decision on domestic violence asylum may be forthcoming from 
the BIA in this case, the briefs were filed in 2011, and at the time of 
170. CGRS Database Case #8389 (2012).
171. The order stated: “In consideration of the joint motion, as well as the totality of the
circumstances presented in this case, the respondent’s application for asylum … is granted.”
CGRS Database Case #8350 (2012).  Although of minimal precedential or persuasive value,
the Board’s decision is significant because it is a grant in a DV case even after the
imposition of the social visibility and particularity requirements.
172. CGRS Database Cases #6778 (2011); #7453 (2011).  At least one IJ also granted a
motion to reopen in a DV case as well.  CGRS Database Case #7821 (2011).
173. This decision was upheld by the Ninth Circuit.  CGRS Database Case #6778 (2011).
174. Under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c), an applicant can only file one motion to reopen and it
must be filed “no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision
was rendered in the proceeding sought to be opened.”  However, under subsection (a), the
Board retains discretion to “at any time reopen or reconsider on its own motion any case in
which it has rendered a decision.”
175. CGRS Database Case #7453 (2011).
176. CGRS Database Case #5256 (2011).
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writing, such a decision had yet to be issued.  CGRS is also aware of at 
least two other domestic violence cases for which the Board has requested 
supplemental briefing from the parties and amici curiae to answer similar 
questions.177  The Board also has before it the validity of the social 
visibility and particularity requirements, which were recently rejected by 
the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.178  Although the Third Circuit case 
does not involve domestic violence or other gender persecution, if the 
Board refines its approach to social group analysis, this could affect the 
analysis in domestic violence cases.  The briefs were submitted in May 
2012, but the Board is under no obligation to timely resolve the matter.179 
IV. CONCLUSION
There has been some movement towards consistent decision making 
since the grants of asylum in Matter of R-A-and Matter of L-R-.  However, 
the information in the CGRS database demonstrates that the absence of 
applicable norms and the shifting policy positions on the part of DHS have 
continued to produce contradictory and arbitrary outcomes in domestic 
violence asylum cases.  Some IJs grant relief in domestic violence cases 
following the official DHS approach in R-A- and L-R- or related precedent, 
whereas other IJs deny relief based on a refusal to see domestic violence as 
anything other than a personal dispute despite external developments in this 
area, and still others deny relief by relying on inapplicable or faulty 
understanding of precedent.  As many women wait in limbo and many 
judges remain resistant, the Courts of Appeals have advanced gender-based 
social groups in other contexts—for example, in the context of female 
genital cutting, forced marriage, and opposition to social mores, 
recognizing social groups such as “Somalian females” or “young girls in 
the Benadiri clan,”180 “women in China who have been subjected to forced 
marriage and involuntary servitude,”181 “women who have escaped 
involuntary servitude after being abducted and confined by [a guerrilla 
organization],”182 “Christian women in Iran who do not wish to adhere to 
the Islamic female dress code,”183 and “women in Jordan who have 
(allegedly) flouted repressive moral norms, and thus who face a high risk of 
honor killing.”184 
But, these decisions have not been sufficient to persuade in many 
instances.  To put it plainly, whether a woman fleeing domestic violence 
177. CGRS Database Cases #8767 (2012); #7186 (2010).
178. Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Att’y Gen., 663 F.3d 582, 608 (3d Cir. 2011).
179. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(8).
180. Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785 (9th Cir. 2005); see also Hassan v. Gonzales,
484 F.3d 513 (8th Cir. 2007).
181. Bi Xia Qu v. Holder, 618 F.3d 602 (6th Cir. 2010).
182. Gomez Zuluaga v. Att’y Gen., 527 F.3d 330 (3d Cir. 2008).
183. Yadegar-Sargis v. INS, 297 F.3d 596 (7th Cir. 2002).
184. Sarhan v. Holder, 658 F.3d 649 (7th Cir. 2011).
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will receive protection in the United States seems to depend not on the 
consistent application of objective principles, but rather on the view of her 
individual judge, often untethered to any legal principles at all.  The U.S. 
government has stated that regulations are “being worked on” by DHS and 
DOJ.185  If the last twelve years are any indication, little confidence can be 
placed in such pronouncements.  The United States should adjudicate 
domestic violence asylum cases consistent with international norms, 
guidance from the United Nations Human Commissioner for Refugees, and 
a growing body of jurisprudence in U.S. Federal Courts of Appeals that 
readily recognize gender-defined social groups, and clearly establish that 
persecution by intimate partners is a basis for asylum. 
 185. The Regulatory Plan, supra note 8, at 64221 (recognizing that “[t]he failure to
promulgate a final rule in this area presents significant risks of further inconsistency and
confusion in the law.  The government’s interests in fair, efficient and consistent
adjudications would be compromised”).
